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ABSTRACT
The recent failures of large banks coupled with unstable 
economic conditions have generated a renewed interest in the 
regulation of large commercial banks. In particular, the 
regulation of bank capital by federal banking authorities, 
which for years, has assumed the role as protector of 
overall banking soundness, has become a highly debated 
topic. This issue is by no means indigenous to recent times 
and the academic and professional literature is replete with 
studies attempting to solve the capital adequacy dilemma. 
Exactly how much capital is enough to ensure the soundness 
of the banking industry has not been agreed upon. But, in a 
ceteris paribus environment, the addition of equity to a 
bank's balance sheet is generally regarded as necessary in 
order to reduce a bank's probability of default.
This study recognizes the normative aspect of capital 
regulation but suggests that a bank may take actions to 
thwart the regulator. Specifically, in response to a 
regulated increase in capital, it is possible (probable) 
that a bank will alter its investment decision, reshuffle 
its asset portfolio by investing in riskier assets, and 
thereby increase its probability of default. Such actions 
would surely retard the efforts of the regulators.
In order to test the asset portfolio reshuffling 
hypothesis and default risk hypothesis, a sample of 79 banks
viii
which were forced by regulators to increase capital from 
1973-1980 were identified. Using matched-pair procedures, 
the behavior of the banks was analyzed with univariate and 
multivariate statistical techniques. Differences in 
behavior were accounted for by comparing various income 
statement and balance sheet data items representing asset 
portfolio composition and risk-return proxies.
The empirical results confirm that banks do respond to 
capital regulation by reshuffling their asset portfolios. 
Banks forced to raise capital levels invested in more 
riskier assets than expected and became more operationally 
efficient than the banks not required to increase equity 
capital. And, as a result of this improved efficiency, the 
observed asset portfolio reshuffling did not result in an 




Purpose of Regulation of Commercial Banks
Commercial banks in the United States are primarily 
regulated by three federal agencies: the Federal Reserve
Board, the Comptroller of Currency and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). While each of these agencies 
take a different approach to bank regulation, their 
underlying objectives and attitudes are basically the same, 
to protect depositors and the depository (payment) system 
and thus the health of the economy. It is this critical 
link between financial institutions and the economy which 
serves as the foundation for the design and structure of 
regulatory agencies as they exist today. As discussed by 
Roger Guffey, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, "the important role played by financial 
institutions in our economy, and by banks in particular, is 
to bring savers and investors together and facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services throughout the payment 
system. Accordingly, they represent the channels through 
which national monetary and credit policies are implemented, 
and their welfare significantly affects the nation's level 
of employment and income."1
1 Guffey (1983), pg. 3.
2
As purported by various authors, Meltzer (1967), 
Bentson (1973), and Black, Miller and Posner (1978), the 
existence of regulation of commercial banks is desired for 
two reasons:2
1. Because of the imperfect transmission of information, 
bank depositors (customers) are at times uninformed 
of the decisions or the financial condition of a 
bank. And it is felt that Federal authorities can 
monitor (examine) and regulate the system more 
effectively and efficiently.
2. Social costs as a result of a fall in public 
confidence of the banking system far outweigh the 
actual cost of the implementation of such a system. 
For example, deposit insurance serves to prevent bank 
failures, and associated costs, resulting from 
deposit runs. Thus, the FDIC simultaneously protects 
the nation's and its own interest.
Capital Regulation of Commercial Banks
This study focuses its attention on one major form of 
bank regulation - the regulation of equity capital. Equity 
capital and the probability of bank failure are related on a 
direct, fundamental level. "The primary function of equity 
capital has been considered to be the protection of 
depositors. The protective function has been viewed not 
only as assuring payoff of depositors in the case of 
liquidation but also contributing to the maintainence of 
solvency by providing a cushion of excess assets so
2 See Posner (1974) or Peltzman (1970) for a review of 
economic theories of regulation.
that a bank threatened with losses might continue in 
operation".3 Given a level of equity capital, the states of 
nature in which bankruptcy will occur are those where Assets 
- Liabilities = Equity < 0, and the higher the level of 
capital, ceteris paribus, the less risk depositors assume.
Capital regulation does have potential drawbacks however. 
In particular, restricting the use of financial leverage, 
debt/equity, reduces the rates of return on equity available 
to the bank. It is feared that this may retard the flow of 
investment dollars into the banking industry and eventually 
have a dampening affect on overall economic growth.
The three major forms of regulation faced by commercial 
banks are portfolio restrictions, Regulation Q, and capital 
requirements. Of these, the latter is the most controversial 
due to the imprecise nature of measuring and enforcing 
capital standards. Traditionally the three agencies have 
used rather informal guidelines to determine an adequate 
level of capital. Futhermore, the standard and the
computation procedure differed across this triumvirate. 
Vojta (1973) reports that the Federal Reserve Board assigns 
different capital requirements to each class of assets 
according to its perceived risk. The Comptroller of
Currency evaluates management and asset quality in 
conjuction with the bank's deposit base to appraise
3 Reed, Cotter, Gill and Smith (1980), pg. 154.
necessary capital. The FDIC' relies on a ratio of equity to 
total assets, net of fixed and substandard assets, and 
employs this measure in the regulation of all commercial 
banks.4
Previous Research Relating to Capital Adequacy
Previous research in the area of capital adequacy has 
primarily focused on:
1. Who should regulate capital? Or the issue of Optimal 
vs. Adequate capital.5
2. How should capital standards be established? Or,how 
effective is the present regime of capital 
regulation? 6
3. What are the costs resulting from inadequate capital? 
Analysis of the social costs and benefits of 
government regulation.7
Limited attention, however, has been given to the possible
reaction by commercial banks to capital adequacy regulation.
Assuming that capital regulation is exogenous to the
decision-making process of the commercial bank, as is the
case presently, how may a bank be expected to respond to
such regulation?
4 See Vojta (1973), pg. 1-15.
5 See Robinson and Pettway (1967), Pringle (1974) and 
Taggart and Greenbaum (1978).
6 See Mayne (1972), Peltzman (1970) and Mingo (1975).
7 See Santomero and Watson (1977).
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Theory of Bank1s Reaction to- Capital Regulation
Theoretic studies by Swary (1979), Koehn and Santomero 
(1980), Edwards and Scott (1977) and O'Hara (1983), have 
directly or indirectly analyzed this question and suggest 
that in response to capital regulation a commercial bank may 
be expected to reshuffle its asset portfolio into riskier 
assets. Further, it is hypothesized that as a result of 
asset reshuffling the bank may actually increase its 
probability of bankruptcy. Such a result is, of course, 
contrary to the soundness objective of regulators. To date, 
however, this joint hypothesis has not been empirically 
tested. Thus, the objective of this study is to determine 
if banks required by regulators to increase equity capital 
do in fact reshuffle their asset portfolios, and as a result 
of any reshuffling increase their risk of bankruptcy.
Outline of the Study
Analysis of the reshuffling and bankruptcy hypotheses 
proceeds in the following steps.
Chapter Two summarizes the models of Swary, Koehn and 
Santomero, and O'Hara which analyze the decision-making 
process of the commercial bank both in an unregulated and 
regulated environment. Special emphasis is given to the 
impact of an exogenous increase in equity capital on this 
process.
Chapter Three introduces Scott and Edwards' and Koehn and 
Santomero's models of bankruptcy risk into the 
decision-making models and looks at how the reshuffling 
hypothesis is related to the probability of bankruptcy.
Chapter Four describes the sample of regulated and 
unregulated banks to be used in the examination of the 
proposed hypotheses. In addition, the design of the 
empirical test employed is derived in this chapter.
Chapter Five presents the empirical results of both the 
reshuffling and bankruptcy risk hypotheses along with some 
statistical insight into the identification process of an 
undercapitalized bank by regulators.
Chapter Six provides a summary of the results and areas 
for further research.
Chapter II 
MODELS OF THE BANKING FIRM
Introduction
The need for artificially regulated levels of equity 
capital of the financial intermediary stems from the theory 
that equity capital provides a cushion against unplanned 
financial difficulties, reduces the probability of default 
and, in effect, acts as a protective buffer for both the 
individual depositor and the banking system as a whole. 
However, as has been suggested by Koehn and Santomero 
(1980), Blair and Heggestad (1978), Swary (1980), Scott and 
Edwards (1977), Kahane (1977) and O ’Hara (1983), the intent 
of the capital regulation is reasonable but may be 
ineffectual. While the belief that increases in equity 
capital reduce the probability of default may have merit, 
the possibility also exists that, in reaction to this 
regulated change in capital structure, the intermediary may 
engage in actions which actually increase the risk or 
probability of default.
This chapter attempts to analyze the effect of capital 
regulation upon the decision-making process of the 
commercial bank by discussing Swary's model of the bank in 
an unregulated environment and comparing these results to 
his model of the banking firm under capital regulation. The
portfolio model approach of Koehn and Santomero is also 
discussed with particular emphasis given to the relationship 
between capital regulation and the optimal asset portfolio 
decision of the commercial bank. Finally, a dynamic 
analysis approach to the banking firm developed by O'Hara is 
examined. The findings are then viewed in terms of default 
probability to measure the overall effectiveness of capital 
regulation.
The Decision-Making Process of Unregulated Banks
Swary's research in the area of capital adequacy 
primarily focused on the regulation of bank holding 
companies but provides a rather useful model of the behavior 
of commercial banks. As Swary points out, the mere 
existence of banks is based upon uncertainty and 
imperfections in the capital markets with regard to the 
collecting and processing of information. Therefore, it 
must be assumed that banks possess comparative advantages in 
securing and disseminating information, which explains their 
presence in capital markets and their ability to provide 
financial services more economically. Swary1s model 
incorporates uncertainty, costs of information, and 
probability of failure in modeling the investment 
(allocation of credit) and financing decisions of the 
unregulated commercial bank.
Assumptions of Swary' s Model-
The commercial bank is viewed as an economic entity 
possessing typical firm behavior in the microeconomic sense,
i.e., inputs, outputs, pricing, etc.8 It is assumed that the 
bank attempts to maximize an objective function, expressed 
in terms of market value, in relation to the equilibrium 
valuation function. The overriding characteristic of the 
valuation function is a linear relationship between the 
returns from any two financial variables, i.e., the market 
value of any given return distribution (generated by 
investments) is set equal to the sum of the individual 
return distributions.9
In contrast to the typical assumptions of insignificant 
bankruptcy costs, as suggested by Warner (1977), Baxter 
(1967) and others, any analysis in the banking area must 
surely recognize positive bankruptcy costs. While there may 
be an argument for zero direct bankruptcy costs, i.e., 
reorganization costs (the costs measured by Warner in his 
study of bankrupt railroads), dismissing relevant indirect 
bankruptcy costs for financial firms, especially the 
disruption of the bank's production process and the supplier
8 Most studies in this area treat the individual bank as an 
investor maximizing expected utility. For example, Porter 
(1961), Klein (1971), Michealsen and Goshay (1967) and 
Pyle (1972).
9 Given competitive markets, arbitrage considerations result 
in this property. See Ross (1976).
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- customer. relationship may be questionable10 As Swary 
points out, "indirect costs of bankruptcy are likely to be 
of paramount importance in the banking industry for the 
following reasons:
1. Given the existence of restrictions on entry to the 
industry, the charter of a bank has a market value. 
Should a bank fail, the market value of the charter 
will be reduced because of direct regulation 
intervention in acquisitions and mergers.
2. Even if entry of firms were not restricted, a bank's 
investment in goodwill would be substantially lost 
should it fail.
3. Regulatory authorities are sensitive to the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. Therefore, regulators are 
likely to impose additional constraints (costs) on 
the bank when the probability of bankruptcy goes 
beyond a certain level."11
10 See Baxter (1967).
11 Swary (1980), pg. 12.
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Balance Sheet
The bank issues three types of liabilities: deposits,
money market instruments and common equity; two types of 
assets: loans and investment securities, and is constrained
by the balance sheet identity:
where:
C = common equity funds endogeneously determined.
F = money market (federal funds) funds which are short 
term and interest bearing, (F>0).
Dm = deposits, m = 1, , M, which are exogenous
and stochastic.
= loans purchased by the bank, i = 1, ... , N.
The bank is assumed to control equity, borrowed funds 
and loans purchased in a heterogenous market with respect to 
underlying credit risk. The bank decides on loans and 
equity capital at the beginning of the period. Immediately
after these decision variables are determined, changes occur
}
in the money market funds' interest rates and deposit 
inflows, which require compensating adjustments in borrowing 
in order to satisfy the balance sheet constraint. The
M




resulting levels of loans, deposits, borrowing, and capital 
then remain constant until the end of the period.
The Investment Decision of the Bank
The actual credit extension process (investment 
decision) of the bank is somewhat different from its 
counterparts in non-financial industries. In particular, 
the loan agreement is much more specific and binding than 
contractual arrangements in the bond market. The bank, in 
fact, circumvents the third party arrangement of the 
trustee, which not only improves the customer relationship, 
but also allows the bank to provide and receive payment for 
servicing the loan. By acting as the trustee of the loan 
agreement, the commercial bank has succeeded in resolving, 
to some extent, the uncertainty of loan default and also 
obtains information valuable to future credit decisions. 
This inventory of information enables banks to provide these 
financial services more economically than other markets. In 
addition, unless banks possess a comparative advantage in 
producing these financial goods, they would not invest in an 
asset, such as loans, that may have a detrimental affect on 
their probability of bankruptcy.
Assume that the market demand for loans consists of N 
borrowers, corporations, seeking financing loans for a
fixed investment in asset A^ yielding the random return .
Define r^ as the market-determined interest factor paid by
the borrower on loan L. and £ as a random variable where:1
C 1 - if loan defaults
■>> ) 0 - otherwise.
Then the probability of default of loan i may be expressed 
as:
L .r .-A .
Pr($.=l) = P. = 1 r 1 f (R ■)d R . (2)\ i  / 1  j  v i  ' i  v '
-oo
and, if the loan is uncollateralized, then a total loss is 
recognized in the period. In addition, define as the
marginal return from information per dollar of loan. 
V^(L^), which presumably decreases as loan size increases,
(3V^/3L^ <0), represents any comparative advantage of 
processing information by the bank.12
Given the information on potential borrowers, the bank 
must decide how to allocate available funds, K, among the N 
loan applicants. In order to focus on the investment 
decision, assume that the capital structure remains constant 
throughout the period. Since the market valuation model 
does not incorporate bankruptcy costs, a safety-first 
constraint is included to control for the probability of 
bankruptcy. The rationale for the choice of the
12 Explicitly this implies a downward sloping marginal 
return from the acquisition and analysis of information.
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safety-first constraint is that the probability of default, 
a, might reduce the market value of the bank equal to the 
bankruptcy costs.13 Expressing the return on bank equity as:
where is the cost of debt (deposits and money market 
funds), the safety-first constraint can be written as:
The probability of bankruptcy is expressd as a function of 
return on equity and the level of equity capital, and 
bankruptcy occurs where return on equity, Rp, equals -100 
percent.
Standardizing and rewriting (4) yields (5), which 
defines a half-plane in the mean standard deviation space, 
in which the firm has to make its portfolio composition to 
generate an expected return and variance that complies with 
the constraint, a. This portfolio composition ensures an 
acceptable level of probability of bankruptcy.
N
R = Z L. [r.(1-tf.)-l] - R , (3)P i=1 i i i d v '
a=Pr(R <-C) P (4)
(5)
where: Z(a) is the inverse of the standard 
normal cumulative distribution.
13 See Telser (1955) .
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Graphically,14 the safety-first constraint is where the ray 
from -C to any portfolio in the (y-a) space defines a 
portfolio with probability of bankruptcy equal to a.(Figure 
1) As the ray rotates toward the vertical axis, the 
portfolios along the ray possess a smaller probability of 
bankruptcy.15 Summarizing, the bank's investment decision is 
how to invest K available dollars in loans which will result 
in the maximum increase in market value (MV-C) relative to 
the safety-first constraint. Mathematically, the investment 
decision may be expressed by:
N




I L. = K 
i=l 1
L^> 0 i=l, ,N
y + Z (a) o = -C P V ’ P
Of particular interest to the present analysis are the cases 
of credit extension and denial, i.e. (1) L. > 0 and (2) L. =v / i * / 1
0. Important implications can be drawn from the following 
relationship:
14 The probability a will typically be low, so Z(a) will be 
highly negative and therefore the ruin constraint line 
will have a positive slope, e.g., a = 0.05 Z(a) = -2.57.






vi ( i  + avi / aL. . L;L/ v i )
+X2 (ayp/3Li + 2(a)aop/3Li ) = ^  (7)
where, by definition, Xa is the change in market value 
realized from a change in loanable funds,16 3H/3K , and 
optimality between any two loans is defined in terms of the 
safety-first constant. Credit extension, therefore, occurs 
up to the point where, for any two loans, i,j, the marginal 
revenue generated from the loan is exactly offset by the 
increased probability of default.17 Explicitly, this 
relationship is shown by:
3H/3C = X2 = Vi ( ( l +3V./aLi -Li / V. )
- V.(1 + 3V . /3L. »L. / V. ) ) /  /aL.3 3 3 3 3 P i
+Z(a)3o /3L.-3y / 3L.+2(a)3a /3L. (8)P P 1 P I
16 where H is the Lagrangian expression of (6), H = 
N
N N
+ X1 (K-Z L.) +X2 (yp + Z (a) ap + C) + Z 2T.L.
17 The increase in the market value of the bank as a result 
of increased risk in the credit portfolio should be 
compared to the increase in expected costs of bankruptcy. 
Swary assumes that a and the safety-first constraint are 
determined in a way that reflects these considerations.
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The Financing Decision
In order for the bank to complete the list of decision 
variables contained in Swary's model, it must evaluate the 
liabilities markets and select that debt-equity mix which 
will optimize market value. The market for the bank's 
liabilities include deposits, purchased funds and equity 
capital. Each source of funds provides the bank with 
necessary cash inflows and a unique pricing structure.
Deposits
Deposits provide customers with a two-dimensional 
product, one that satisfies the customer's demand for 
transaction services and acts as an investment for 
depositors. Thus, the actual investment in deposits is 
assumed to be a function of the differential between yields 
on similar risk assets, the explicit transfer cost, and the 
inelastic demand for deposits as a transactions vehicle. 
Therefore, deposit levels are assumed to be exogenous to the 
decisions of the commercial bank.
Purchased Funds
Purchased funds represent a dynamic medium for banks to 
obtain sources of funds. Since the 1960's, purchased funds 
(large negotiable certificates of deposit, federal funds, 
Eurodollar loans and Federal Reserve loans) have represented
19
a large reservoir of funds .which are traded in a highly 
competitive market and provide the banking system with 
necessary liquidity. In general, purchased funds are 
assumed to be homogenous with respect to maturity, rates, 
reserve requirements and increasing marginal acquisition 
costs, and are the banks only source of debt funds in this 
model.
gggitg
Supplies of equity capital are assumed to flow from an 
efficient market providing no consistent abnormal 
(risk-adjusted) returns. Equity acquisition costs are 
positive and are assumed to exceed that of purchased funds. 
In contrast, they are inversely related to issue size.
Financing Decision: Selecting the Optimal Capital Structure 
Assumptions:
To introduce the relevant capital markets into the 
financing model, Swary makes the following additional 
assumptions:
1. Loans are considered homogenous in a risk-return 
sense with a perfectly elastic supply. The loans 
purchased, determined at the beginning of a 
one-period planning horizon, carry fixed rates.
2. A negative covariance exists between deposit inflows 
and the yield on money market funds.
3. Money market rates exhibit high degrees of 
variability with low transaction cost on a volume 
basis and increasing marginal borrowing costs.
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4. The level of equity capital is assumed constant
throughout the period. Thus deposit fluctuations are 
met with purchased funds.
The notation is similar to that of the previous equations,
with:
r = interest factor on loans.
V = returns from information per dollar of loan (note the
subscript is dropped due to homogeneity of loans).
= deposit yielding zero interest, t=0,l.
In addition, define:
i0 = the stochastic public deposit flow during period 1, 
bounded by -D0 and Dj, , the upper bound on maximum 
deposit inflow during the period.
i = rate paid for purchased funds
cov(11,i ) = covariance between deposit inflows and 
rate paid on purchased funds.
3(F) = relative change in i as a function of 
acquisition of purchased funds.
T(F) = transactions costs associated with debt funds,
T 1(F )>0, T ' '(F)>0.
T(C) = transaction cost associated with equity funds
T'(C)>0, T''(C)<0. Where by assumption T(C) > T(F).
The bank's decision now becomes one of choosing the 
optimal amount of loans and borrowed (purchased funds and 
equity) funds which would result in maximizing the market 
value of the firm:
MAXIMIZE (MV-C) = LV-T(C)





V +Z(a)o = -C P P
Once again the objective function is constrained by the 
individual bank's safety-first constraint (5) and the 
balance sheet identity (1). Conditions for optimality are 
defined where a marginal increase in.market value equals the 
marginal cost of funds employed. Thus, increasing firm size 
through credit extension requires the use of either debt, or 
equity funds, which, in turn, implies the following 
optimality conditions:
1. if purchased funds are held constant:
V + X2 (3yp/aLi+3op/LiZ(a)+l) = T'(C) (10)
or
2. if equity is held constant:
V +X2 (3yp/3Li + 3op/3Li»Z(a) ) =
F F
T'(F) J  (F-x)f (t)dt +T(F) / f(t)di (11)
-D g -D 0
-X2 (3yp/3F+Z(a).3op/3F)
Equations (10) and (11) explicitly state that market value 
maximization is achieved when the marginal return from loans 
less the cost of employed funds equals the change in market
22
value resulting from a change in the probability of 
bankruptcy.
Therefore, a formal solution to the decision-making 
process of the unregulated banks, may be found in the 
interaction between the investment and financing decision 
which yields the optimal composition of assets (loans) and 
sources of funds (deposits, purchased funds and equity). 
Combining the individual optimality conditions,
(8),(10),(11), Swary obtains the expression for the optimal 
bank size:
[Vi(l+3V./9Li.Li/Vi ) -Vj(l+3Vj/3Lj.Lj/Vj )]/
[ 3iip/3Lj+Z(a)3Rp/3Lj- 3y /SL^-Z(a ) 3ap /3L. ] =
(12)
F F
[T '(F ) / (F-T)f(T)dt +T(F) /  f(x)dT-T'(C)]/
-Do -Dq
[3p /3F+Z(a )3o_/3F-1]
Three variables have an impact on the optimal size 
solution: (1) V*, the marginal return from information on a
dollar of loans, (2) the marginal cost of acquiring the 
necessary sources of funds and, if properly specified, (3) 
the safety-first constraint.
The preceding discussion of Swary's decision-making 
process of an unregulated bank provides important insight in 
the evaluation by individual banks of investment and
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financing opportunities, and also provides a framework 
through which the effect of regulation can be measured.
Banks Decision Making Process Under Regulation
In order to measure the effect of regulation on a 
commercial bank's decision-making process, Swary introduces 
various constraints into his unregulated model to serve as 
proxies for different forms of regulation. This type of 
analysis supplies descriptive insight into the bank 
decision-making process and highlights the deficiencies of 
regulation from a normative viewpoint.
Swary employs a direct chance constraint to estimate 
the normative comparative statics. These estimates are in 
turn contrasted with the statics from various portfolio 
contraints intended to serve as real world proxies of 
capital regulation. Equally important is how the normative 
versus the descriptive cases differ and what reaction banks 
may have in response to regulation. In all cases, the 
effect of regulation is measured in terms of default risk 
via return variance.
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Normative Case:Direct Chance Constraint
In order to apply the direct chance constraint to the 
normative model, it is assumed that regulators can, in fact, 
determine the upper bound on the probability of failure 
which is acceptable and enforceable. This means that the 
regulatory agency must set a limit on failure, which is 
somehow introduced into the unregulated model. Summarizing 
Swary's model under this normative direct chance constraint, 
it is found that, as the constrained probability of failure 
decreases,
1. the level of equity increases, reducing the reliance 
on financial leverage.
2. the value of an additional dollar of loans decreases, 
3X1/3Z(a)<0 .(See footnote 16).
3. the shadow price of the safety-first constraint 
increases,
3X2/3Z(a) >0 .(See footnote 16).
This third result reinforces the actual 
interrelationship between the investment and financing 
decisions as implied by the optimality requirement of higher 
returns for a given loan and lower financial leverage with 
respect to the unregulated bank. This result is not 
surprising, considering the intent of regulation is to 
improve the soundness of the banking industry and each of 




Currently, regulations attempt to control bankruptcy 
risk by imposing various balance sheet constraints, such as 
limits on lending exposure, reserve requirements and 
leverage restrictions. Each of these regulations are 
interrelated in the sense that all are a function of the 
bank's level of equity capital. While the intent of 
prescribed regulation is clear, the bank's adherence to 
policy must be taken into account along with an evaluation 
of the decision-making process in a regulatory environment, 
viewed with respect to the normative model. While deriving 
an optimal solution under such conditions, Swary found 
evidence supporting the regulators' claim of improving bank 
soundness through capital regulation; however, the 
possibility of actions taken by the bank which are contrary 
to regulatory objectives are also suggested. Swary's 
framework of analysis is based on assumptions identical to 
the normative model with capital constraints incorporated, 
which are intended to act as risk boundaries.
The banks objective function is to, again, select that 
investment portfolio and level of purchased funds which 
maximizes the market value of the firm:
N
MAXIMIZE fMV-Cj = E L.V.-T(b(F+D ))i=l 1 1  °
F




L .>0 vi 1
L .<a«C=a»b(F+D ) i ' o '
N
1 L .=(F+D )(1+b-h)• _i i oi = l
where:
a = percentage of equity, set by regulators, that the bank 
is allowed to loan to any one individual borrower.
h = percentage of all deposits and purchased funds held in 
riskless assets - (reserve requirement).
b = regulated debt/equity ratio.18
Therefore, regulators view capital as a necessary and
sufficient cushion that will reduce bankruptcy risk, and
allow banks freedom, albeit somewhat artificial, given other
characteristics of the markets they compete in, to make
their asset (total size and portfolio) and financing
(deposits and purchased funds) decisions. Optimality
conditions require that the marginal return from any two
loans,(i,j) are equal to the marginal cost of debt held in
proportions defined by the leverage constraint. That is,
3H/3Li = 3H/3L^ * i ,j (14)
Noting that:
18 Because this leverage constraint must be binding for the 
model to provide insight, Swary requires that C = b(F^ +
27
3H/3Li = aH/aF[ l/( 1+b-h) ]=3H/3Lj (15)




+T'(F) /  ( F-t )f (t )dx
-D0F
+T(F) /  f(t)di 
“Do
= [V.(l + 3V./3 L . • L ./V .)-<*>•] (16)i y  i y  i i v '
As shown by (15) regulation determines the level of 
equity and purchased funds through leverage constraints and 
thus clearly affects default risk. Therefore, as a means of 
providing a cushion to absorb any unanticipated capital 
losses and to generate liquidity, regulated capital levels, 
(which are assumed to be greater than pre-regulation), do, 
in fact, achieve the goal of default risk reduction. 
However, there is the question of the spillover effects that 
capital regulation has on the investment portfolio and the 
banks credit extension criteria.
These effects can be seen clearly by way of comparison 
of optimality conditions. For the unregulated bank, 
optimality was defined where the marginal returns from
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information for loan i offset the marginal cost due to the 
safety-first constraint:
V i(+3Vi/aLi*Li/Vi )-X1X2 (3Vp/3Li+Z(a)3op/aLi )=0 (17)
Where for the regulated bank, optimality is given by the 
condition
3H/3L.•L.=0=L.[V.(1+3V./ 3L.•L ./ V .)+Z.-u.-\.] (18)/ 1 1  1 l' l H / l ' l l l  v /
Of significant difference is the absence in (18) of any 
affect that a loan extension would have on the probability 
of default where (17) explicitly accounts for a shift in 
this probability.
Interpreting these results, Swary suggests that (1) 
regulated banks vis-a-vis unregulated banks are no longer 
concerned with bankruptcy risk, measured in terms of 
variance of return on investment portfolio, when making the 
credit extension decision and (2) regulated banks concerned 
with total return on the portfolio may actually accept loans 
rejected under the unregulated scheme. Continuing Swary's 
analysis to include direct chance regulation, the separation 
between the intent and actual effect of the imposed capital
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regulation becomes apparent/ Here again Swary notes the 
bank's disregard for portfolio risk in the investment 
decision. "Where as the intended effect of regulatory 
constraints is to decrease the rate of substitution between 
risk and return in all decisions, including investments(loan 
exstension), such constraints eliminate any risk 
considerations which are liable to increase the 
variance-risk of a loan portfolio."19
Bank Reaction to Capital Regulation
Swary's conclusions appear to indict the overall 
effectiveness of capital regulation with respect to the 
bank's decision making process. But his model falls short 
of a rigorous evaluation of the hypothesis that banks do 
indeed take on more risky (variance-risk) portfolios as a 
result of capital regulation. Such an evaluation requires a 
re-evaluation of the investment decision and any possible 
limitations the capital (leverage) constraint would impose. 
It must be noted, however, that the problem does not arise 
due to the inadequacy of regulation, but as a result of the 
reaction by the decision-makers, post-regulation. In an 
independent study Koehn and Santomero (1980), here after 
denoted K-S, identify the dilemma caused by regulation and
t
provide a model that explicitly examines this reshuffling
19 Swary (1980), pg. 49.
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hypothesis. Their framework-of analysis recognizes that the 
intent of regulation is to reduce default risk of banks, but 
assuming that portfolio risk is not adequately constrained 
by regulation, the hypothesized reshuffling is indeed 
plausible.
Koehn-Santomero Portfolio Investment Model
Assumptions
1. The total assets size is a decision variable of bank 
management. In the sense that only amounts of debt 
relative to equity is regulated, bank size is 
unconstrained.
2. The rate paid on the negative asset (deposits) is 
risk free but a riskless asset (positive-holding) is 
not available.20
3. In constrast to Swary, K-S model the banks as a
single-period risk averse expected utility
maximizer.21
4. Whichever risk-averse function is chosen, it is
assumed to be approximated by a Taylor-series 
expansion truncated after the second moment.
5. While not necessary to the derivation, the bank is 
assumed to operate in a competitive market. "Given 
that the regulator fixes the capital to assets ratio 
K = E/TA, the choice problem facing the bank is to 
determine (1) its optimal scale, i.e., the amounts of 
both deposits and equity to issue, and (2) the 
optimal allocation of this asset pool over the
20 Essentially the bank issues the risk free asset in the 
Koehn and Santomero model.
21 This assumption agrees with the work done by Michealsen 
and Goshay (1967) and is intuitively appealing 
considering that the majority of banks are, in fact, 
closely held.
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available risky asset set."22 In essence, the 
regulators view financial leverage as being 
detrimental to financial soundness and thereby use 
capital regulations to retard the bank's use of 
financial leverage. Since size is assumed to be a 
choice variable (assumption 1) and the market is 
assumed to be a competitive one,23 the bank may 
increase its use of financial leverage only by 
increasing capital and size and it may lever itself 
(and of course its earnings) without limit. 
Therefore the allocation process becomes paramount to 
the bank and, as given by assumption 4, will be 
described in terms of risk/return (variance) per unit 
of equity capital.
Theoretically, the bank must determine, out of the 
universe of risky assets, which assets to purchase, and the 
weightings of such assets that maximize its utility 
function. Applying the formulation suggested by Merton 
(1972), K-S describe the banks portfolio decision as the 
following:
N N




x q£ 1-1/K (21 )
N
E (R )=x R- + Z x .E (R .) (22)' p y o f  . l v l ' v 'i = l
22 Koehn and Santomero (1980), pg. 1236.
23 For a discussion of the implications of imperfect 
competition refer to James (1976).
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where:
E(R^) = expected return on ith asset.
= percent of equity value invested in the ith asset.
a. . = covariance between asset i and j. ijE(Rp),0p 2 = expected portfolio return and
variance/unit of equity.
Xq = percent of equity held in deposits paying risk free return
R̂ . = risk free rate of return.
X = trade-off between risk,a 2, o P
and return E(R^) at any point on the efficient frontier.
K = Equity Capital/Total Assets.
While the regulator attempts to set an upper limit on 
leverage, as seen through the inequality in (21), the major 
thrust of the analysis is the effect of such regulation on 
the decision making process of the bank. Therefore, in 
order to model the bank's reaction the capital constraint,
(21) must be binding:
x q = 1-1/K (21.1)
The necessary conditions for determining the optimal 
investment portfolio chosen by the bank, given the capital 
constraint, are 1) the simultaneous solution to (19) through
(22) and 2) the condition set fort by X0,i.e., the marginal 
rate of substitution as exhibited by the firm's objective 
function.
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The Individual Banks Utility Function
In order to equate X0 with the marginal rate of 
substitution, first assume that the bank possesses a single 
period risk-averse utility function expressed in terms of 
end-of-period capital:
U = U(C + RpC) (23)
Expanding this function around beginning capital yields:
U = U(C) + U'(C)RpC + U''(C)(RpC)
+ higher order terms (23.1)
The expectation of (23.1) becomes:
E(U) = E[U(C)] + U'(C)CE(R )
r*
+ 1/2U''(C )C 2E (R 2) (24)P
Now define o 2 as:P
E (Rp-E(Rp ))2 = E(Rp 2)-[E(Rp )]2 (24.1)
and substituting (24.1) into (24) yields:
E(U) = EtU(C)] + CU'(C)•
[E(R )+U" (C)/2U! (C)»C*{E(R )2+c 2 } ] (25)
lr r
As formulated by Pratt (1964), an estimate of the relative 
risk aversion exhibited by a particular utility function is 





The utility function adopted by K-S is defined to be 
functionally related to end-of-period capital, with a 
relative risk aversion coefficient given by:
U 1'(C)C
r = - _________________ (27)
2 U'(C)
Introducing r into (25) enables expected utility to be
expressed as a function of E(R ),o 2 and r.P P
E(U) = U(C)+ U' (C)C[E(Rp )-r[E(Rp )2+op 2H  (28)
Now, the second necessary condition to obtain an 
optimal solution to (19) can be achieved by deriving an 
expression for the marginal rate of substitution between 
risk and return, and, in turn, equating this to \Q . Thus
define:




and equating to \q obtains:
X = MRS 2 , = l/r-2E(R ) (30)o °p /E (Rp) 7 p'
Substituting (30) into (19)-(22) K-S derive the desired
investment allocation value, Xi*, i.e., the optimal weight
of asset i held in the portfolio. Specifically:
Xi* = A»C(l/r-2Rf)-C(1+B)1/K
N N
•ll (E(R )-R (^ ))/A- (AZ rp . /C ) ]
j=l 3 3 i=l 3
N







B=Z Z rp. . (E(R. )-R.) (E(R.)-R-)i=lj=l 1 f J f
N N
C=Z Z rp. .• -1 nill=lj=l J
D = BC-A2
24 rp _  are the elements of the inverse of the variance 
covariance matrix, i.e.,21 = (^— ), see Merton ( 1972 ).
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The Reaction of Bank to Capital Regulation
We now begin to see how capital regulation affects the
investment decision of the bank, inasmuch as the optimal
investment proportion in risky asset i per unit of capital
is shown to be a function of the return generating function
of the available assets, the individual bank's relative risk
aversion parameter and the capital ratio. In fact, the
impact of capital regulation becomes transparent when viewed
in light of the marginal effect on the decision making
process as a result of a change in K, the capital
constraint. Given the circumstances at hand, K-S25 suggest
the following:26
From the budget constraint (21) and the capital 
constraint (22), it is clear that the bank will be 
unable to leverage its capital to the degree it 
had prior to an increase in K, and moreover, 
because of the new more stringent restriction on 
the leverage capability of the bank, the banks 
efficient investment frontier falls downward and 
to the left for any given level of capital., i.e.,
25 Koehn and Santomero (1980), pg. 1239.
26 See Koehn (1979) for detailed discussion of the effects 
of various restrictions on the efficient frontier.




Equation (32) therefore provides support for capital
regulation as the post-regulation investment opportunities
of the bank possess less risk in terms of a 2 , for everyP
possible portfolio return. The central question remains, 
however, what will be the reaction of the bank in response 
to the proposed capital regulation?
K-S, as did Swary, suggest that in response to a 
regulated capital structure change, the bank will reshuffle 
the holdings of assets in its portfolio possibly resulting 
in even riskier (post-regulation) asset portfolios. This 
reshuffling hypothesis follows by differentiating (31) with 
respect to K and writing the result in elasticity form27
dK x.l
= l/xj.* (l/r-2Rf )AC/C+D)
N




K-S interpret (33) as "the elasticity of proportional 
demand for the ith asset with respect to the capital asset
27 Koehn and Santomero assumes the banks utility function 
exhibits constant relative risk aversion.
38
constraint at the optimum."28
Equation (33) now becomes the critical variable to 
support this reshuffling hypothesis. K-S complete their 
indictment of capital regulation by recognizing a. as the
tr
risk contribution of asset i to the portfolio and thereby 
proving that:
ti 1 >ti , if o. >o. (34)x. k x. k ip ip ' 'i, J, *
Thus, "subsequent to the imposition of a decrease in 
leverage capability, an increase in K, the reaction is to 
reshuffle its portfolio, j ri kl > ^' result;i-n9
i ,
portfolio is described by relatively more risky assets than 
before the increase, this result is obviously contrary to 
desired (regulator) result."29
0 1Hara1s Dynamic Theory of the Banking Firm
Recognizing the inadequacies of modeling the 
complexities of a bank's operations in a single-period 
framework, O'Hara (1983) developed a mutiperiod model of the 
commercial bank applying dynamic analysis. This modelling 
approach is required in order to incorporate- the three-fold 
personality of a bank: 1. as a financial intermediary, 2. as
28 Koehn and Santomero (1980), pg. 1240
29 Koehn and Santomero (1980), pg. 1240
traditional firm, and 3. as a regulated enterprise. The 
management of an intermediary must deal with both default 
and market risk from the lending function together with 
withdrawal risk from borrowing. In addition, although the 
objective of a traditional firm is to benefit stockholders, 
the agency problems due to separation of ownership and 
management must be recognized. And, finally, as a result of 
exogenous regulation, further restrictions on the 
decision-making process are introduced. Thus, O'Hara 
assumes the manager will maximize his utility subject to the 
constraints imposed by stockholders and regulators, and the 
manager will receive utility from his compensation, W^, he 
extracts from the bank in every period:
00 tMAX E [ I o U(W ) ]
t=0 r
where a is the discount factor applied to future 
compensation.
The regulatory constraints imposed upon the manager 
take the form of reserve requirements, P = percentage of 
deposits, and capital requirements, B = Equity/Assets. The 
bank is described as a typical intermediary which accepts 
deposits and makes loans. Deposit inflows and loan demand 
are assumed random and the bank has direct access to capital 
markets providing short-term liquidity.
The model is driven as the manager determines personal 
compensation, Wfc, the banks loan portfolio, L^, and the
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level of deposit services, S^, at the beginning of period t. 
The deposit services generate deposits for period t, D̂ ., and 
loans granted are due at the end of the period. At the end 
of period t, bank profits are determined, stockholders 
receive dividends and period t+l's net worth is known, Y. 
Bankruptcy is defined where net worth at the end of the 
period is below that level required by regulators, Y < B. 
If Y > B then the manager has satisfied both stockholders 
and regulators and the bank's operations continue.
Of interest to this study is how the manager's 
decision-making process may be altered by changes in the net 
worth constraint. As pointed out by Koehn and Santomero, 
one effect of a change in capital regulations is a reduction 
of feasible or permissable investments by the manager. In 
turn, this altering of the investment opportunity set will 
result in a reduction of the managers present value of 
wealth, if his investment portfolio remains unchanged. 
O'Hara examines the reaction by the manager as a result of 
capital regulation and concludes that if the manager 
percieves that the future operations of the bank cannot 
sustain the new required net worth level, it may be optimal 
for the manager to take the money and run.30 Another 
possibility, however, is that the manager invests in a 
riskier portfolio in the hopes that the higher mean return
30 O'Hara (1983), p.139.
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on such investments can produce a higher profit level for 
the bank. Of course the irony is, as recognized by others, 
that this paradoxical situation that increasing the required 
net worth to presumably make the bank safer results in an 
increased risk exposure for the bank.
Summary
- Based on the regulators intent that capital regulation 
improves, reduces risk, the soundness of the banking firm, 
three model's have been discussed in hopes of evaluating the 
impact of this form of regulation.
Swary's model of the unregulated bank was examined to 
serve as a benchmark from which to judge capital 
regulation's effect on the decision-making process. Under 
this unconstrained (exogenous) environment, the banks' 
optimal investment and financial decision was found by 
equating the information resulting from the marginal dollar 
of investment (loan, investment securities, etc.) and the 
marginal cost of funds with respect to the individual bank's 
safety-first constraint.
Further, it was seen that by introducing capital 
regulation, risk was expected to be lower, as illustrated by
l
Swary's normative model. But, it was revealed, in a 
practical sense banks may ignore the effect that various
investment and financing decisions have upon their 
riskiness. In particular, when Swary introduced the 
capital-asset ratio , optimality conditions equated marginal 
revenue of investments with marginal financing costs, but 
the absence of a default risk variable in the optimal 
solution suggested possible deficiencies in capital 
regulation. And, as suggested by Swary and rigorously 
derived by Koehn and Santomero and O'Hara, banks, as a 
result of capital regulation, may actually reshuffle their 
asset portfolio, resulting in a more risky post-regulation 
asset portfolio. Such a result, therefore, suggests that 
not only is capital regulation ineffectual, but possibly 
detrimental to the underlying riskiness of the banking 
industry.
Chapter III 
CAPITAL REGULATION AND BANKRUPTCY RISK
Introduction
The analysis thus far suggests two propositions 
regarding the effects of capital regulation:
1. In response to a regulated shift in capital 
structure, the bank attempts to offset the reduction 
in financial leverage by reshuffling its asset 
portfolio, resulting in a more risky position.
2. As a result of such reshuffling the post-regulation 
probability of bankruptcy may differ from regulatory 
intent and, in particular, may increase.
Justification for proposition 1 stems from the 
forementioned models of Swary and Koehn-Santomero. Further 
discussion of this point will be reserved for a later 
chapter in as much as we will attempt to empirically test 
this reshuffling proposition.
Keeping in mind that regulators employ various 
regulations in order to control the soundness of the banking 
industry, i.e., entry restrictions, pricing constraints, 
activity restrictions, capital structure control and insider 
abuse restrictions,31 discussion of proposition 2 is 
necessary to evaluate the implications the reshuffling
31 For a detailed discussion of these regulations see 
Edwards and Scott (1978).
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hypothesis has upon bankruptcy risk.
So far, except for a few comments of the Swary model, a 
theoretical link between the intent of specific regulation 
and bankruptcy risk is noticeably absent.
Scott-Edwards Bankruptcy Model
A rather elegant approach to modelling bankruptcy risk 
for the commercial bank was suggested by James Scott and 
Franklin Edwards (1977). The Scott-Edwards analysis was done 
in a framework of how two hypothetical banks are affected by 
soundness regulations. These two banks are primarily 
differentiated by their access to capital markets:
1. The partial access bank (PAB) is assumed to have
restricted access to capital markets in the sense 
that information costs are higher for these banks 
(smaller in total assets) resulting in 
inefficiencies in the pricing of their securities. 
This assumed restricted access in effect requires 
that partial access (smaller banks) banks rely 
heavily on the sale of assets in raising needed 
funds.
2. The full access bank (FAB) is characterized by the
ability to raise funds in both debt or equity 
markets and that their security issues are fairly 
priced.
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Using a traditional measure of bankruptcy, as the point 
where cash flows of the bank from operations, X, fall below 
some critical level b in a mean standard deviation 
framework, it is obvious that given a change in either 
parameter of the distribution of cash flows yields a 
corresponding change default probability. Graphically, the 
probability of bankruptcy,(Pr X < b) is shown in Figure 2. 
Thus, it is apparent that bankruptcy (insolvency) is 
achieved when either operating losses, devaluation of assets 
or large withdrawal of funds (deposits) results in 
insufficient cash as to meet its current obligations. Based 
on their respective definitions, the partial access bank 
more closely parallels the banks included in the forthcoming 
empirical analysis, therefore the bankruptcy model will be 
discussed in terms of the PAB.
X = CASH FLOW BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 




Xi = earnings before interest and taxes plus security 
gains or losses, EBIT, at period one.
= total assets valued at historical cost, t=0,l
d^ = total deposits
i = interest rate paid on deposit at t=0 
= non-deposit bank debt
R̂ _ = interest payments required to service D̂ .  ̂ due at 
t .
T = marginal/average tax rate
In the Scott-Edwards model, the bank is assumed to 
operate in a two-period world, t=0,l, where period one 
earnings are assumed random and liabilities are certain.
If cash flows from operations are less than cash needs, 
the PAB is assumed to sell assets in attempt to remain 
solvent. Measured at t^, solvency can be defined as the 
existence of positive net worth, i.e.,
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AA= change in assets from t to t,,AA = A.-A  ̂ o 1' 1 o
In addition, the cash flow condition can be seen by 
defining after-tax cash flow from operations as:
(l-T).(X1-ido-Ro ) (36)
and the net deposit drain as:
(d^-d ) + (D-. -D ) (37)' 1 o ' v 1 o ' v '
For the PAB, the sale of assets will be required to 
prevent insolvency if (36) plus (37) is less than the 
critical level b. Further, it is assumed that when the PAB 
attempts to sell its assets, it faces a decreasing liquidity 
function receiving ZhKx , from the sale of AAX, where Z < 1. 
Therefore, as the bank attempts to supplement any operating 
cash deficiency, the maximum amount of assets at book value 
that the bank will have to sell is given by:
l/H[(l-T)(X1-id0-R1 )+(d1-d0 ) +(D1-Dq ] = AA1 (38)
which in turn, implies the following solvency condition in
terms of operating cash flow, Xj,:
X x>[(ido+R1 )-(d1-do )/(l-T>]
-[(D1-Dq )/(1-T)]-[£(A0-d1-D1/(l-T)] (39)
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It is clear that the critical level, b, is equal to the 
RHS of (39) and as operating cash flows including the sale 
of assets, falls below this point, bankruptcy will occur. 
Referring back to Figure 2, if operating cash flows are 
assumed to follow a normal distribution characterized by the 
cumulative distribution function G(X1), then the probability 
of bankruptcy can be expressed as G(b), the shaded area in 
Figure 2.
Given this ability to measure bankruptcy probabilities, 
Scott-Edwards ask the question: For an individual bank
possessing a cash flow distribution as described above, how 
will changes in the distributions' parameters alter the 
probability of bankruptcy? Actually, this is the premise 
underlying the actions of most bank capital regulation and 
should provide further insight into the evaluation of any 
proposed constraints.
Parameter Shifts and Bankruptcy Probability
Under the assumption of normally distributed cash flows 
three alterations of the parameters are relevant:
1. A Change in the mean of the distribution holding 
dispersion constant.
2. A Change in mean and o . 1
3. A Change in o.
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Based on the analysis discussed in Scott-Edwards (1977), the 
effects of such parameter changes on the probability of 
bankruptcy are presented.
A Change in Mean of the Pistribution of X
In order to see the effects on the probability of 
bankruptcy given a change in Xj while holding standard 
deviation constant, replace X : with X a + a in (39), where a 
is a "perfectly certain, lump sum, increase (decrease) in 
before tax earnings."32 (39) then becomes:
X1 > {-ct+b) (40)
where: b equals the RHS of (39);
and the probability of bankruptcy for this bank is defined 
as G (-a + b). The effect of the change in X on G (• ) is
seen by taking the partials:
3G( -cc+b)
_____________  = -g[-a+b] < 0 (41)
9a
where g (•) = probability density function of X 1(g (• ) = G' 
(•). Thus the probability of bankruptcy will decline (rise) 
as a result of increasing (decreasing) mean cash flow.
32 Scott and Edwards (1977), p. 22.
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A Change in Both the Mean and Standard Deviation of X
Such a parameter shift is accomplished by replacing X x 
with XXj in (39) yielding:
X1 > b/X (42)
where: X>0 and
b=RHS (39).
The effect of increasing (decreasing) X increases 
(decreases) both X and o proportionally and results in a 
seemingly ambiguous impact on probability of bankruptcy,
G (b/X):
3G(b/X) -g[b/\] <




as b = 0  
>
Scott-Edwards contend that the most plausible outcome 
is for b<0, implying that a bank with non-positive earnings 
before interest and taxes can remain solvent. Under such 
conditions, an increase in X will unambiguously increase
bankruptcy probability.33
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A Change in the Standard Deviation of X Holding Mean 
’Constant
In order to increase dispersion, a, and hold the mean 
constant substitute X x with 6(X: - X a ) + X : , where an 
increase (decrease) in 5 increases (decreases) a in Eq. 
(39). The solvency condition now becomes:
X1>X1 + (b-X1 )/5 (44)
and the probability of bankruptcy is defined as
G[X1 + (b-X1)/6] (45)
In terms of the impact on G (•),
3G[X1+(b-X1)/6] j^-b >
__________________ =   = 0 (45)
36 62 <
<
as b = .
>
It initially appears to yield an indeterminant result but 
Scott-Edwards assume that for most banks b < X*, therefore 
implying a positive relationship between bankruptcy risk and





__________ > 0  (47)
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Capital Regulation and Bankruptcy Ri sk
The purpose of the above three exercises becomes 
apparent as Scott and Edwards trace the analogy of capital 
regulation's effect upon the bank's cash flow distribution. 
In particular, as they consider two types of capital 
regulation, leverage and equity ratios, and their 
interrelationship with cash flow and bankruptcy risk.
Recognizing a regulated bank's preference for issuing 
combinations of equity and debt versus asset liquidation to 
satisfy required capital shortages, requires the bank to 
invest these funds and it is this asset investment which 
causes the cash flow transformation. Scott-Edwards conclude 
their analysis of capital regulation by proposing two 
scenarios constructed under the following balance sheet 
constraints:
1. A requirement on leverage that total assets exceed 
total deposits by a fixed percentage,
l
A >(5d , where (3>1 (48)o o
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2. A capital ratio of stockholders equity to total 
deposits,
A -d -D >0 d , where 0>O (49)o o o o
CASE _1: What are the effects on solvency of issuing new
debt or equity where the additional funds have no effect 
on the banks cash flow distribution?
The simplest, and in actuality, the most frequent action of 
a bank is to use retained earnings as the required equity 
source, which would reduce the probability of bankruptcy:
3b -Z 3Ao
• = _____  •__________ < 0 (50)
30 (1-T) 30
(50) represents the normative situation desired by 
regulators. This reduction in bankruptcy risk underlies a 
common view that capital acts as a cushion to absorb future 
losses which as pointed out by (50) translates into 
increasing the assets base which may, in turn, be sold by 
the bank to prevent insolvency. The likely alternative 
would obviously be:
CASE 2: What is the effect on bankruptcy if a bank issues
equity and issues these funds to invest in assets which
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result in changing the firm's cash flow distribution. 
There exist three investment possibilities with 
corresponding impacts on bankruptcy risk.
Case 2.1: The bank uses these funds to purchase risk-free
assets. Such an investment policy would parallel the 
case of a certain lump-sum increase in the mean of the 
cash flow distribution which as implied by (41) and (50) 
reduces the bank's probability of bankruptcy.
Case 2.2: The bank uses the additional funds to invest in
assets of the same risk level as the existing asset 
portfolio. Introducing the leverage constraint into Eq. 
(39) yields:
X x> l/Pdo.[ido+Ro-(d1-do )+(D1-Do ) +d(Pdo-d1-D1)]/(l-T) (51)
where (i ) A =3d . v ' o o
(ii) xA =x£d . . ' o o
(iii) xA =X,. x ' o 1
and, x = percentage return on asset portfolio,
Denoting (y) as the RHS of (51), the resulting impact on 
risk is given by:
a(y)/3& = -l/32dQ «[dQ (y )+£dQ/ (1-T)]
=l/32d [id +R +[ (d +D )- ' o 1 o o v o o'
(1-*)(d1+D1 )/(l-T)]}<0 (52)
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In the case where the bank holds the riskiness of its asset 
portfolio constant/ as long as d 0 + D 0 > (l-£)(di + D x ) ,
then the infusion of equity capital results in a decline in 
bankruptcy risk.
Case 2.3: Banks issue equity and use the funds to greatly
increase the riskiness (earnings variability) of its 
asset portfolio.
Analogous to the effect a proportional shift in the mean and 
standard deviation of cash flow has upon bankruptcy, it is 
apparent from (43) and (46) that there exists some risk 
return locus for the banks portfolio that will increase the 
probability of failure in spite of increasing the equity 
cushion. While their model does not explicitly suggest that 
asset reshuffling will occur they do concur with Swary and 
cast further doubt on the effectiveness of capital 
regulation by concluding that "even equity requirements can 
fail to bolster soundness if banks invest the additional 
funds in sufficiently risky assets."34
34 Scott and Edwards (1977), pg. 42.
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Bankruptcy Risk in the Koehn- & Santomero Model
Returning to the K-S framework, their model, as 
developed, does provide an explicit reconciliation of the 
reshuffling hypothesis and bankruptcy absent from Edwards 
and Scott's analysis. K-S make no specific assumptions 
regarding the distributions of returns from the banks 
portfolio, employing Chebyshev's Inequality to estimate 
probability of failure. Expressed as a function of the 
capital/total asset ratio, K, expected return on bank's 
portfolio and variance of return, Chebyshev's Inequality 
estimates the upper bound of the probability of bankruptcy
where q is a constant > 0. Rearranging (53) yields:
Define b, ( Rp - qon), as the bankruptcy level of return, 
then q can be expressed as:
Pr( Rp-E(Rp ) > qap ) < 1/q2 (53)
(54)
(55)
Substituting this definition of q into (54), yields:
P r(R <b) £ a 2/(E(R )-b) = Pv p ' p ' v ' p' ' (56)
35 See Blair and Heggestad (1978) for a detailed discussion 
and interpretation of (53).
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The K-S model thus far has been expressed in terms of return 
on equity versus total available funds, therefore (53) 
becomes internally consistent by multiplying the bankruptcy 
level by (1 + D/E) and substituting this result into (55):
Pr(Rp<-1) < op/(E(Rp )+l)2 = P (57)
where:
3P/3op 2>0, 3P/3E(Rp )<0
As shown by Roy (1952), Blair and Heggestad (1978) and 
Kahane (1977), P corresponds to the upper level of the 
probability of failure and is defined as the reciprocal of 
the slope of a ray in mean variance space. Graphically, 
Figure 3, this ray must intercept the return axis at -1 




The optimal solution to the portfolio allocation
•kproblem, (i = 1, . . . , n) , is solved in terms of the
tangency of the utility function to the efficient frontier,
E 0. For example, if the optimal portfolio is represented by
* *
Z 0, the optimal risk-return locus is E(R ),a . Asp p
drawn, the upper boundary of failure is constant along P 0.
Now suppose regulators require the bank to increase its 
capital base. Not only will the anticipated reshuffling 
occur but the efficient investment frontier shifts down and 
to the left , E x.36 The overall result is that the bank may 
choose between three risk-return alternatives.
Portfolio A. The bank chooses a risk-return 
combination identical to the pre-regulation portfolio. In 
this case, the regulators have achieved their desired result 
of reducing probability of bankruptcy. The slope of the ray 
from (-1, PQ ) has increased, implying a lower upper boundary 
on this probability. However, we know that A, will not 
become the equilibrium portfolio because of the reshuffling 
effect. As shown, subsequent to an imposed capital 
structure shift the bank will reshuffle its asset portfolio 
investing in more risky portfolios the equilibrium portfolio 
will be a function of risk aversion and firm specific
36 See Koehn and Santomero (1979), pg. 1243.
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utility function. The bank then will either choose 
Portfolio B or Portfolio C.
Portfolio B. As a result of capital regulation, the bank 
has increased the substitution between risk and return but 
the effect of the frontier shift has more than offset the 
reshuffling effect resulting in greater bankruptcy risk than 
possessed by portfolio A, but less than the pre-regulation 
position, Z 0, i.e., P : < P2 < Po
Portfolio C. In the last case, the bank through the 
reshuffling effect has increased the portfolio risk 
(variance) to such an extent that it overwhelms the frontier 
shift effect yielding a riskier position, in terms of 
bankruptcy risk, then prior to capital regulation, i.e., P 3
> P„.
K-S explain the reasoning underlying such a result by 
pointing out that banks with low levels of risk aversion 
will engage in reshuffling to a greater extent than banks 
with a larger b. This in turn implies that the less risk 
averse bank will settle on Portfolio C and an increase in 
the probability of failure. "In terms of the equilibrium 
investment model, this explanation can be seen by 




_______________  >0 (58)
db
Thus, ap 2 declines for every bank's portfolio, but the 
absolute magnitude of the decline depends on b. However, if 
b is sufficiently small, the fall in E(Rp ) along with the 
reshuffling of the portfolio implies that the chance of 
failure increases."37 Based on these results, K-S propose 
two hypotheses:
1. Suppose that capital regulation was imposed uniformly 
across the industry. The preceding analysis suggest 
that reshuffling of asset portfolios would occur and 
the degree to which portfolio risk is increased is a 
function of the risk aversion parameter of the 
individual bank. In any case, the more risky banks 
will actually circumvent regulators intent and 
increase the riskiness of their asset portfolio to a 
greater extent thant their more risk-averse 
counterparts. The macro-industry implication of this 
hypothesis is that "the final distribution of risk of 
failure for the banking industry will therefore 
possess a higher dispersion than before the 
imposition of regulation."38
37 Koehn and Santomero (1979), pg. 1243.
38 Koehn and Santomero (1979), pg. 1244.
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2. Suppose instead that' regulators attempt to impose 
capital regulation on that segment of the industry 
which possesses an excessive probability of 
bankruptcy. Also it may be safe to assume that this 
chosen sector exhibited low levels of risk aversion. 
Under the framework of analysis, such a hypothesis 
suggests that banks that are faced with non-market 
capital structure shifts because they are perceived 
to possess excessive levels of risk would react not 
by reducing their bankruptcy risk but by reshuffling 
their asset portfolio achieving even higher levels of 
bankruptcy risk. (Portfolio C).
It is this second hypothesis which provides the basis 
for the following empirical research. If a sample of banks 
can be isolated which experienced regulated capital 
structure increases, was there a corresponding reshuffling 
of their asset portfolio, as suggested by Swary, Edwards and 
Scott, Koehn and Santomero and O'Hara, relative to banks 
which experienced no such capital structure shift?
Chapter IV
SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL TEST DESIGN
Introduction
Chapters Two and Three analytically derived the 
decision-making process of the commercial bank under two 
polar environments: a completely unregulated framework and
under a framework of various forms of balance sheet 
regulation. It was shown that in an unregulated world the 
commercial banks maximize their objective functions by 
equating the marginal return from the lending activity with 
the marginal cost of making a particular loan. And where 
marginal cost is defined as the reduction in market value 
attributable to the safety-first constraint, the bank 
explicitly incorporates the impact of risk 'in its lending 
policies. In contrast, the commercial bank operating in a 
regulated regime involving capital structure constraints, 
optimizes its objective function by equating marginal 
returns from loans with the marginal cost of acquiring debt 
and equity funds. Absent is the effect that the credit 
extension and its corresponding contribution to the 
riskiness of the asset (loan) portfolio has upon the default 
risk of the bank.
Of particular interest is the possible reaction a 
commercial bank may have to an exogenous change in its
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capital structure. While capital structure regulation 
actually constrains the permissible risky portfolios the 
bank may select, which could result in lowering the bank 
probability of default, the ability of the bank to somehow 
offset this effect becomes of primary importance. 
Specifically, that in response to an exogenous constraint on 
the mix of funds the bank is allowed to employ, the 
regulated bank will reshuffle its asset portfolio moving 
along the investment frontier as to actually increase its 
default risk. This chapter presents univariate and 
multivariate tests designed to determine the impact that 
capital structure regulation has upon the commercial banks 
asset portfolio decision, and in turn, attempts to measure 
whether the post-regulation portfolio exhibits greater 
default risk.
Formal Statement of the Hypotheses
It has been suggested that a bank in response to a 
exogenous shift in capital structure will reshuffle its 
asset portfolio as to invest in more risky assets. Further, 
this resulting asset portfolio may offset the intent of the 
regulation by increasing the regulated banks probability of 
default. Formally:
Asset Reshuffling Hypothesis:
X i = “ + &i(IC0DE) + 32 (YR) + &3 (icode*yr)
B3x °. (59)
Default Risk Hypothesis
RETURN = a + p (ICODE) + P2 (RISK) + &3 (RISK*ICODE)
Yr = year subsequent to capital regulation,
0 ,1 ,2 ,3,4
Icode = classification code
0 - bank was required to increase capital.
1 - bank was not required to increase capita
Risk = Return on Total Assets measure of dispersion.
B3x°. (50)
where:
= percentage of total assets invested 
in asset i .
Return = Total asset portfolio return measure.
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Sample Selection
In order to test these hypotheses, a sample of banks 
which experienced a regulated capital structure change is 
required. As many researchers in the area of capital 
adequacy are frustratingly aware, such a sample of banks is 
not publicly available. Regulators feel that making such 
information public, identifying those banks which are forced 
or encouraged to increase capital would be contrary to their 
soundness objective. Therefore, a sample of banks which 
experienced a regulated change in capital structure was 
generated through a nationwide mail survey. Due to the fact 
there are over 14,000 commercial banks in the U.S., it was 
necessary to first screen the total universe of banks based 
on the following criteria.
Regulatory Environment
There are four national regulatory agencies which have 
varying degrees of control over the nation's commercial 
banks, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the Comptroller of 
Currency and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Each 
of these agencies have different and sometimes overlapping 
responsibilities with respect to the regulation of the 
banking industry. In an attempt to raise the level of 
homogeneity of the test sample, at least with respect to 
regulatory environment, it was decided to consider only
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nationally chartered banks for the final sample. While both 
the FDIC and Federal Reserve do have legal authority over 
some activities of nationally chartered banks, the Federal 
Reserve must also regulate state banks which are members of 
the Federal Reserve, while the FDIC is responsible for state 
and nationally chartered banks which may or may not be 
members of the Federal Reserve. Because of this intricate 
maze of governing bodies the banking community generally 
posits that the Federal Reserve and the FDIC relegate 
primary responsibility of nationally chartered banks to the 
Comptroller of Currency. In addition, by excluding all 
state chartered banks from the sample, the regulatory 
influence of fifty different state banking authorities need 
not be considered.
Data Availability
An initial requirement of empirical tests involving 
time series testing is a sufficiently continuous data base. 
Defining sufficient ex-ante is not always straight forward 
but visions of unlimited data must be tempered with the 
realities of accessible data. The largest bases of 
commercial bank data, both in terms of data elements and 
time period available, are the FDIC tapes which contain both 
annual Income Statements and Reports of Condition for all 
chartered banks from 1972-to the present. It was decided
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that the period 1972-81 would be sufficiently continuous, 
and therefore, as a second sample screen, only banks with 
continuous and complete data for 1972-1981 were eligible for 
inclusion in the final test sample.
Capital Structure Shift
Given that the premise of the research at hand is 
contingent upon first identifying a sample of banks which 
experienced a regulated capital structure shift, any screen 
based on this criteria may seem transparent. Therefore, in 
addition to the obvious time and financial constraints of a 
mail survey of this magnitude, a precise definition of 
capital structure shift both in terms of levels of 
significance and characteristics was deemed essential. And 
by casually observing the capital structures of banks 
throughout the country, it is not surprising that all banks 
are experiencing some degree of change in their capital 
structure.
The final criteria employed in selecting the sample to 
be surveyed were to have banks which experience in any one 
year between 1973-1980 an increase in its capital/total 
assets ratio of at least 25 percent,39 and to have sold 
common stock in the year of the 25 percent capital/total
39 It is hardly expected that larger banks, assets exceeding 
1 billion dollars, would increase capital at this rate. 
Therefore, the scope of the study will be limited to 
small banks. (See tables 3 and 4).
70
asset increase. It is important to note that capital is 
defined in the pure sense, i.e., capital equals retained 
earnings plus common stock accounts. Thus by requiring a 
stock issuance any observed shift in the capital ratio can 
only be as result of a pure equity increase.
Survey Results
Questionnaire Results
Based on the three stage screen outlined in the 
previous section, 511 nationally chartered banks were 
identified that experienced at least a 25 percent increase 
in capital/total assets and issued common stock. Each of 
these banks was sent a questionnaire which required the bank 
to (1) verify report of condition and income statement 
information from the FDIC data base (2) confirm that a 
common stock issue occurred in the year of the capital 
structure increase and (3) provide reason as to why the 
capital structure increase and subsequent equity issue took 
place. Although data verification was important, question 
three determined the actual test sample. The bank was given 
the choice of four reasons for the observed capital 
structure shift:
1. REGULATORY OFFICALS REQUIRED THAT MORE 
CAPITAL BE RAISED EXTERNALLY.
71
2. REGULATORY OFFICALS SUGGESTED THAT MORE 
CAPITAL BE RAISED EXTERNALLY.
3. REGULATORY OFFICALS HAD NO DIRECT PART 
IN THE DECISION, BUT MANAGEMENT BELIEVED 
THAT THEY WOULD SOON SUGGEST OR REQUIRE 
ADDITION CAPITAL.
4. REGULATORY OFFICALS HAD NO DIRECT PART IN 
THE DECISION; IT WAS AN INTERNAL MANAGEMENT 
DECISION.
Out of a total of 511 questionnaires initially sent, 
245 responses were received. Two weeks following the 
initial survey, a follow-up letter with an identical 
questionnaire was sent. As expected, the second mailing was 
far less successful and 55 additional responses were 
received. The breakdown by catagory of responses to 
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No Influence 92 4
The Regulated Sample
Since the objective of the mail survey was to identify 
banks which experienced a forced capital structure change 
from 1973-1980, the 92 banks which indicated that the 
capital structure change was not regulated were, of course, 
eliminated from inclusion in the test sample. Also deleted 
were the 58 banks which indicated that the reason for the 
capital structure change was that regulators had no direct 
influence, but management felt the regulators would soon 
require a capital infusion. This additional paring was 
based on the feeling that unless regulatory authorities had
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a direct influence upon the capital increase such 
observations may bias the test results.
Keeping in mind that the scope of the testing surrounds 
the period of time after the intervention of regulators, a 
workable number of data points is required. Therefore, the 
timing of the capital structure shift was to determine the 
final test sample.
TABLE 2
Response to Bank Type Code/By Year
TYPE 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
1 9 10 7 6 3 7 12 9
2 16 16 5 10 8 17 13 13
3* 8 8 9 14 4 7 4 .4
4 * 29 18 10 6 5 6 13 5
Tot 62 52 31 36 20 37 42 31
Tot.
1+2 25 26 12 16 11 24 25 22
Cum. 
Tot 25 51 63 79 90 114 139 161
( *As pointed out all banks with TYPE, response co<
4 were deleted.)
Of the 161 banks with response codes of 1 or 2, the 82 
banks which experienced capital regulation from 1977-1980 
were excluded form the final sample. This final restriction 
resulted in a test sample of 79 banks with data for at least 
four years after the capital regulation (see Table 2).
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the final test 
sample for the year in which the capital structure shift 
took place.
TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics - Means
Primary Sample 
Cash & Due/Total Assets 
Investment Securities/Total 
Loans/Total Assets 
Demand Deposits/Total Assets 
Time Deposits/Total Assets 
Equity Capital/Total Assets 
Return on Assets 






32 . 60 percent
46 .02 percent
5 . 49 percent
0 .768 percent
10 . 48 percent
39,584, 000 dollars
Matched-Pair Sample
The proposed reshuffling hypothesis entails not only 
the question of reshuffling in absolute terms but the 
determination of whether any observed reshuffling is 
significantly different from expectations. In this regard, 
changes in parameters must be compared with a benchmark or 
control sample similar to the test sample except for the 
exogenous effect of interest. While technically all banks 
are regulated to some extent, for simplicity the control 
sample will be referred to as the sample of unregulated 
banks and the experimental sample will be the regulated 
banks.
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With respect to capital- structure effects, the criteria 
for identifying an unregulated bank was that (1) any 
increase in capital/total assets was less than 10 percent; 
and (2) the bank did not issue common stock from 1973-1980. 
To control for the regulatory environment, all banks in the 
control sample were required to be nationally chartered. To 
control economic and demographic factors, the matching bank 
had to be in the same state and, where appropriate, SMSA as 
the regulated bank. If the regulated bank was part of a 
holding company, then so must be the matching bank. The 
final criteria controlled for differences in size, measured 
by total assets.
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the 
unregulated sample for the year in which its matched pair 




Summary Statistics - Means
Match-Paired Sample - Unregulated Banks
Cash & Due/Total Assets 11.49 percent
Investment Securities/Total Assets 29.84 percent
Loans/Total Assets 50. 08 percent
Demand Deposits/Total Assets 35. 12 percent
Time Deposits/Total Assets 46. 65 percent
Equity Capital/Total Assets 8.00 percent
Return on Assets 0. 969 percent
Return on Equity 12 .53 percent
Total Assets 34, 722,000 dollars
Test Methodology
Formal testing of the reshuffling hypothesis and the 
corresponding shift in the banks risk-return locus followed 
a two-phase methodology: (1) Univariate Tests and (2)
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Employment of both univariate 
and multivariate techniques results from the high 
intercorrelation between the financial variables used to 
measure capital regulation effects.
In this study, the following portfolio items and 
profitability measures were examined:
TABLE 5
Assets Portfolio and Profitability Variables
Portfolio Composition
1. Cash & Due from Banks/Total Assets
2. Investment Securities/Total Assets
3. U.S. Securities/Total Assets
4. Goverment Agency Securities/Total Assets
5. State & Political Subdivisions 
Securities/Total Assets
6 . Net Federal Funds/Total Assets
7. Total Loans/Total Assets
8 . Real Estate Loans/Total Assets
9. Commercial Loans/Total Assets
10. Consumer Loans/Total Assets
11. Construction Loans/Total Assets
12. Farm Loans/Total Assets
13. Demand Deposits/Total Assets
14. Savings Deposits/Total Assets
15. Total Time Deposits/Total Assets
16. Equity Capital/Total Assets
17. Total Loans/Total Deposits
18. Risky Assets/Total Assets
4
19. Total Assets
20. Total Operating Revenue
B. Profitability Measures
21. Return on Assets
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22. Return on Equity
23. Operating Expenses/Operating Revenue
24. Loan Losses/Total Loans
25. Interest on Bonds, Notes & Securities/
Investment Securities
26. Interest Paid on Borrowed Funds
Univariate Tests
The first tests of the reshuffling hypothesis are 
intended to compare and contrast the portfolio holdings and 
profitability measures of the regulated and unregulated 
banks. This "first pass" at identifying the effects of 
regulation, while not possessing a great deal of explanatory 
power, should isolate significant differences between the 
bank samples which will be rigorously examined with 
multivariate testing procedures.
It is anticipated that (1) significant differences do 
exist in the year of regulation, t = 0 and, (2 ) if the 
observed capital regulation is effective, then more 
homogeneity exists between the financial variable in the 
post-regulatory years, t = 1,..,4. Hence, the tests should 
indicate differences at t = 0. Depending on the bank's 
response to the capital regulation, any changes in the 
bank's financial condition will be measured. It should be 
noted that the time required to adjust portfolio composition
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following capital, regulation is unknown. Even if regulation 
has some effect, differences or similarities may continue 
during the early stages of the post-regulation period, thus 
the results in periods t = 3,4 will possibly be quite 
informative.
Differences in the means values of the financial 
variables will be tested by the use of the Students "t" 
statistic for paired observations:40
W  D
t = ____  (61)
S2 b d
where:
D - v - y r u
y^ - mean of the portfolio or performance ratio for the
regulated bank.
- mean of the portfolio or performance ratio for the
unregulated bank.
n - number of banks in the sample.
S2^ - standard error of the estimate of D.
40 See Ostle and Mensing (1975), pg. 121.
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Multivariate Tests
As widely known, one weakness of using the "t" test is 
the inability to make time series comparisons, i.e., given 
two periods and corresponding "t" statistics, the fact that 
one "t" is greater or less than the other does not imply a 
divergence or convergence between the time periods. In 
addition by analyzing a series of "t" statistics the 
relationships between variables is ignored and, as 
previously mentioned, the financial variables used in this 
research tend to be highly intercorrelated. Thus, 
multivariate tests will be employed to' account for the 
variations over time and between variables.
Analysis of Variance
The univariate test discussed above only serves to 
raise the suspicion that certain banks are reacting to 
capital structure regulation and this reaction takes the 
form of asset portfolio reshuffling. Analysis of variance 
techniques can also test not only for differences in mean 
values between groups but for changes in variables (means) 
between groups over time. With regard to the stated null 
hypotheses, the magnitude of these changes in portfolio 
composition shed light on the capital regulation issue.
Tha analysis of variance test will be conducted in two 
stages corresponding to the two null hypotheses: stage one
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investigates the reshuffling hypothesis and stage two 
addresses the question of shifts in the risk-return 
relationships as a result of portfolio decisions. Since the 
time series behavior of these relationships is critical, 
both models used in testing cover the post-regulation 
period.
Reshuffling Test Design
The reshuffling hypothesis primarily centers around the 
relationship between asset portfolio composition and capital 
regulation and, in particular, how any changes in asset 
portfolio differed between groups. In order to determine 
whether the two samples, regulated and unregulated, were 
comparable in terms of possible trends in portfolio 
•reshuffling (59) was employed.
The impact of capital regulation will be contained in the 
estimates of the regression coefficients of (59).
Xi = a + 3X (ICODE) + S2 (YR) + 33 (ICODE *YR) +z± 
where the testable hypothesis is:
Hq : e3 = 0
3  3 *  0
82
The mean values of corresponding to different values 
of the independent variables are:
E(X±|ICODE=0) = a + 02 (YR)
E(Xi|IC0DE=1) =(0+0!) + (02+03)(YR) 
and
E(ei ) ^  N(0,a2)
E(eiej ) = 0 , i*j
Interpretation of the regression coefficients are as 
follows:41
a = mean value of X^ for the regulated sample 
at t=0 .
a+0! = mean value of X^ for the unregulated sample, 
at t=0 .
02 = estimate of the change in the mean of X^ (slope)
from the year of capital regulation to the 
end of the test period, t=0,..,t=4.
03 = estimate of the difference in the change in the mean
of X^ for the unregulated sample vis-a-vis the
regulated sample.
With respect to the reshuffling hypothesis, the 
estimate of interaction term, 03, is most informative. By 
construction, it is the interaction term which accounts for 
any differences in mean holdings of asset^ between the two 
samples subsequent to the imposition of capital regulation. 
Specifically, 03 significantly < 0 indicates an increase in
41 For a detailed proof of these equalities and
interpretations of the coefficients see Kmenta (1971), 
pg. 409-425.
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the holdings of asset^ by the regulated group vis-a-vis the 
unregulated sample during the post-regulation period. 
Conversly, if g3 is significantly > 0 then the unregulated 
groups' mean holdings of asset^ is increasing relative to 
the regulated group over the same test period.
Default-Risk Model
As outlined in chapters two and three, Swary, Koehn and 
Santomero, Scott and Edwards, and O'Hara suggest that banks 
react to regulatory imposed increases in capital, and as a 
result, reshuffles the asset portfolio thereby altering its 
risk-return locus. Even if asset portfolios reshuffling is 
detected, the issue remains whether the post-regulation 
portfolio has increased or decreased the underlying default 
risk of the regulated bank.
Before discussing the empirical model, the two 
parameters of the hypotheses must be defined, risk and 
return. In the financial or non-financial firm, return is 
generally defined as either return on assets, ROA, or return 
on equity, ROE. Given that the reshuffling hypothesis 
centers around fluctuations of holdings in the asset 
portfolio, ROA would seem appropriate as the overall measure 
of return. Further, inasmuch as default risk is defined 
where the return on assets is equal to -100 percent, tests 
involving the return series of the asset portfolio would
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provide information as to the direction of default 
probability.
The choice of the appropriate risk proxy is 
unfortunately not quite as straightforward. In defining 
risk there is a divergence resulting from the viewpoint 
taken. From the stockholders' position, the relevant 
measure of risk stems from portfolio theory.
Portfolio theory defines the relevant risk of an asset 
as beta, the covariance between the return on that 
individual asset and the returns on the market portfolio 
divided by the variance of the return on the market 
portfolio. In contrast, the regulatory agencies are 
primarily concerned not with stockholders1 risk but total 
risk, i.e., the risk that the bank will fail. Again, 
recalling that default probability is expressed in terms of 
ROA and variance of ROA, the relative dispersion of the ROA 
distribution will proxy for portfolio risk. Thus, multiple 
regression analysis will be used to determine whether any 
asset portfolio reshuffling exhibited by the regulated group 
resulted in a deterioration of the risk-return locus 
relative to unregulated banks. The regressors of ROA 
variable will be four measures of relative dispersion42 of
42 The use of estimates of the dispersion parameters yield 
regression estimates which are biased and lack the 
property of consistency. And traditional approaches to 
resolve these measurement error problems proved 
unsuccessful. See Neter and Wasserman (1974), p.168 for 
a discussion.
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the post-regulation ROA distribution:
1. Coefficient of variation of net income
2. Variance of return on assets
3. Coefficient of variation of return on assets
4. Chebyshev's Inequality
The test equation can be expressed in the form:
ROA = Constant+3i(Icode) +g2(R i )+ &3(Icode*Risk)+s^ (62) 
where:
RISK = ROA dispersion parameter
ICODE = 0 - Bank was forced to increase capital.
1 - Bank was not forced to increase capital.
The mean values of ROA corresponding to different 
values of the independent regressors are:
E(ROAllCODE=0) = a + S2 (RISK)
E(ROA|IC0DE=1) = (a+Si) + (32+33)(RISK)
Interpretation of the regression coefficients follows that
of the asset reshuffling tests:
a = mean ROA for the regulated sample.
(a+3i) = mean ROA for the unregulated sample.
(32 = estimate of the relationship between ROA and risk 
measure of asset portfolio.
$3 = the difference in the relationship of ROA and risk 
between the unregulated and regulated banks.
While the estimate of the coefficient of RISK, 32/ 
measures the relationship between overall risk and return 
for the banking industry, or a subset thereof, in terms of 
relative default risk the coefficient of the interaction 
term, 33/ captures the information required to test the 
default risk hypothesis, Eq (60). Therefore, regardless of 
the estimate of 32/ a significant positive sign for 33 
implies the regulated sample increased the variability of 
ROA relative to ROA, subsequent to capital regulation, at a 
faster rate than the unregulated sample during the 
post-regulation period. Such a finding, in turn, indicates 
an increase in default risk by the regulated sample versus 
the unregulated group. Conversely, a negative coefficient 
for the interaction term suggests an increase in the 
risk-return locus by the unregulated sample relative to the 
regulated sample.
Summary
The methodology presented in this chapter will be used 
to determine if regulated banks react to capital regulation 
by reshuffling its asset portfolio. The emphasis of the 
reshuffling and default risk hypotheses center mainly on the 
relationship between pre-and post-regulation portfolio risk. 
Employing a matched pair technique, empirical tests were 
designed to measure the degree of reshuffling and any
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The testable hypotheses are that a commercial bank, 
required by regulatory agencies to improve its capital 
position, will respond by reshuffling its asset portfolio 
and investing in more risky assets. And as a result of 
reshuffling, the bank's asset portfolio will possess a 
higher degree of default risk as compared to the unregulated 
sample. The obvious implication is that while the purpose 
of capital regulation is to improve (decrease) the default 
risk of commercial banks such regulation may not only be 
ineffectual but contrary to intent.
A sample of 79 banks are identified that were required 
by bank regulators to increase their capital ratio through a 
common stock issue. Using a matched pair sample technique, 
the reshuffling and default risk hypotheses are investigated 
in this chapter. In both univariate and multivariate tests, 
the data supports the theory that banks do in fact reshuffle 
their asset portfolios in response to a forced capital 
structure change. In addition, the evidence suggests that 
regulated banks increase the riskiness of their asset 
portfolio through this reshuffling process. Regarding the 
default-risk hypothesis, while it appears that portfolio
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reshuffling has occurred, these same banks are becoming more 
operationally efficient and as a result reducing 
default-risk relative to the unregulated sample.
Univariate Tests
As previously noted there may exist a great deal of 
economic interrelationship between the balance sheet and 
income statement ratios. Therefore, in order to justify the 
application of univariate tests and any subsequent 
interpretation of the results, a multivariate analysis of 
variance, MANOVA, on the entire ratio vector was performed. 
Such a test will determine if there is any justification to 
suspect that differences exist between the two groups which 
may be further analyzed by univariate statistics. The 
result of the MANOVA test indicates a statistically 
significant difference between the mean vectors at the .0001 
level. Therefore, there is evidence that the regulated and 
unregulated groups are in some way different at t=0 and the 
use of univariate tests to highlight these differences is 
justified.
Paired "t" tests of differences between means were then 
computed for all portfolio composition and profitability 
variables listed in Table 5. Analysis of these statistics, 
Table 6 , reveals that in the year of regulation, the 
regulated sample, as would be expected, was
strikingly different than the unregulated sample with 
respect to both asset composition and profitability. At the 
time of regulation, t = 0 , the regulated bank can be 
described as a bank which held fewer investment securities, 
therefore held a larger percentage of assets as loans, 
employed fewer demand deposits and more borrowed funds, were 
net sellers of federal funds and overall had a higher 
loan/deposit ratio. In terms of profitability, the 
regulated bank realized a lower return on investment 
securities, total assets and equity, experienced higher 
costs on borrowed funds and were less operationally 
efficient as reflected by a higher percentage of operating 
expenses to income. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that at t = 0 , regulated banks were overall riskier as 
indicated by the loan/deposit ratio and significantly less 
profitable as per return on assets and equity. This 
conclusion is hardly unexpected and, in fact, if contrary 
relationships were present, one would certainly question the 
reliability of the test sample. Although the precise 
factors behind a regulators intervention are not public 
information, it would be safe to assume that balance sheet 
and income statement data will highlight differences that 
would be a basis for regulatory action.
Recalling that the timing of the portfolio reshuffling 
process is unknown, differences or similarities in the
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subsequent years should not be viewed as necessarily 
supportive or contrary with the stated hypotheses. Instead, 
it has been suggested that an adjustment period of one or 
two years be introduced to allow the firms reaction, if any 
exists, to regulation to take effect on its financial 
structure. Therefore, it is anticipated that while the 
effects of some decisions will appear rapidly, the overall 
reaction of the regulated bank sample may not be observed 
until some three or four years subsequent to the forced 
capital structure change, t = 3,4. Thus, in order to 
determine whether the "t" tests reflect on either the 
reshuffling or default risk hypothesis, data from the entire 
post-regulation period must be examined.
There are significant changes occurring in periods t = 
1 and t = 2 which reflect on the reshuffling hypothesis. 
One year after regulation, the regulated sample, while 
retaining the vast majority of differences in portfolio 
composition from the base year, did increase its dependence 
upon demand deposits as a financing source and has altered 
its profitability characteristics. In particular, it is 
observed from Table 6 that regulated banks have increased 
gross yield on earning assets primarily due to a higher rate 
of return on its securities investment portfolio. As will 
be argued and tested in a later section, this result 
suggests some degree of reshuffling of the investment
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portfolio toward riskier securities. The contention is that 





Results of Univariate "t" tests
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 0
Variable Regulated Unregulated Pr > |tl
Cash/Total Assets 11.137 11.486 .6520
In. Sec/TA 27.418 29.840 .0620
U.S. Sec/TA 8.899 9.873 .0420
Agency Sec/TA 5 .581 5.865 . 7862
Munic/TA 10.181 15.388 . 0001
Fed Fnds/TA 2 . 403 4. 600 . 0050
Loans/TA 58.059 50.084 . 0001
Real Est/TA 17.816 18.141 .8451
Comm/TA 20.375 18.189 .2765
Consum/TA 3 .539 3 . 768 .8620
Const/TA 0.430 0.296 .5631
Farm/TA 8 . 172 9.385 .4978
Dem Dep/TA 32.608 35.122 .0630
Sav Dep/TA 21.297 22.136 . 6525
Tot Time/TA 46.021 46.652 . 7487
Equity/TA 5 .497 8 . 005 .0001
Loans/Dep 66.105 55.911 .0001
Risky Ass/TA 49.703 45.022 .0340
Total Assets 39,584,000 34,722,000 .5916
Operating Rev 2, 813,000 2,358,000 .4743
ROA 0 . 768 0.969 .0160
ROE 10.481 12.534 .0156
Expenses/Revenue 86.504 82.291 0104
Loan Loss/Loans 1 .215 1. 342 .2276
Interest/Invest Sec 5.502 6.464 .0389
Interest Paid 5 . 525 5.222 .0067
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TABLE 6 (contd.)
Results from Univariate "t" Tests 
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 1
Variable Regulated Unregulated Pr > |t(
Cash/Total Assets 10.738 10.476 .6270
In. Sec/TA 26.938 29.573 .0511
U.S. Sec/TA 9.506 10.016 . 6743
Agency/TA 5.375 6.042 .5160
Muni /.T A 10.567 15.209 .0001
Fed Fnds/TA 2. 173 4. 997 . 0044
Loans/TA 57.324 50.718 .0001
Real Est/TA 18.269 18.672 . 8059
Comm/TA 20.929 17.996 . 1256
Consum/Ta 6.076 5. 799 .8561
Const/TA 0. 636 0.482 . 5386
Farm/TA 8.002 9 . 764 . 3409
Dem Dep/Ta 31.578 33.101 .2172
Sav Dep/TA 22.043 22.686 . 7220
Tot Time/TA 44.081 45.725 .4248
Equity/TA 7.546 7 . 989 . 1020
Loans/Dep 65.176 56.757 . 0001
Risky Ass/TA 50.621 46.636 .0467
Total Assets 42,064,012 37,780,303 . 6356
Operating Rev 3,192,189 2,680,460 .4972
ROA 0. 631 1.005 .0002
ROE 8.232 12.661 . 0151
Expense/Revenue 89.509 82.524 .0001
Loan Loss/Loans 1.215 1. 267 . 6145
Interest/Invest Sec 5.696 6.341 . 1098
Interest Paid 5 . 612 5.384 .0253
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TABLE 6 (contd.)
Results from Univariate "t" Tests 
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 2
Variable Regulated Unregulated Pr > |t[
Cash/Total Assets 10.279 10.Ill .5765
In. Sec./TA 28.619 32.990 .0216
U.S. Sec/TA 10.231 10.850 . 6200
Agency/TA 4. 934 5. 726 .3854
Munic/TA 10.467 14.895 . 0001
Fed Funds/TA 1. 858 3 . 098 . 1326
Loans/TA 59.016 53.134 .0007
Real Est/TA 19.866 19.824 . 9860
Comm/TA 20.380 17.593 . 1289
Consum/TA 13.148 10.940 .2124
Const/TA 0.983 1.004 .9482
Farm/TA 8.081 9 . 773 .3705
Dem Dep/TA 30.374 32.025 . 1948
Sav Dep/TA 22.762 23.626 . 6406
Tot Time/TA 40.511 39.621 . 6804
Eguity/TA 7 .241 8 . 016 . 0053
Loans/De'p 66.532 59.213 . 0002
Risky Ass/TA 50.668 46.131 . 0323
Total Assets 45,431,354 41,161,101 . 6491
Operating Rev 3, 459,632 2,972,974 .5113
ROA 0.741 0. 984 .0004
ROE 10.691 12.520 .0347
Expenses/Revenue 87.913 83.408 . 0002
Loan Loss/Loans 1.047 1.065 .8540
Interest/Invest Sec 5.383 5. 614 .5862




Results from Univariate "t" Tests 
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 3
Variable Regulated Unregulated Pr > |t|
Cash/Total Assets 10.624 9.976 .2070
In. Sec./TA 30.108 35.089 .0293
U.S. Sec/TA 9.818 11.001 .3447
Agency/TA 4. 780 4.886 . 8966
Munic/TA 9.880 13.795 . 0001
Fed Funds/TA 2 . 704 3 . 718 .2511
Loans/TA 59.634 54.584 .0038
Real Est/TA 20.479 20.888 .8142
Comm/TA 20.225 16.628 .0491
Consum/TA 19.419 16.287 .0406
Const/TA 1.287 1.367 .8122
Farm/TA 8 . 027 9. 621 . 4087
Dem Dep/TA 30.367 30.419 . 9666
Sav Dep/TA 23.021 24.143 .5438
Tot Time/TA 36.059 35.219 . 6488
Equity/TA 7 . 337 8.056 . 0068
Loans/Dep 66.791 60.856 .0027
Risky Ass/TA 47.615 43.431 .0746
Total Assets 49,131,721 44,834,215 .6511
Operating Rev 3, 965,101 3,413,683 .5022
ROA 0. 790 1.020 .0005
ROE 11 .224 12.771 .0700
Expenses/Revenue 87.072 83.382 .0021
Loans Loss/Loans 0.915 0.922 . 9294
Interest/Invest Sec 4.466 4. 624 . 6836
Interest Paid 6 . 139 5.816 . 0711
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TABLE 6 (contd.)
Results from Univariate "t" Tests 
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 4
Variable Regulated Unregulated Pr > Jt|
Cash/Total Assets 10.325 10.062 . 6719
In. Sec/TA 35.059 39.780 .0762
U.S. Sec/TA 9.638 10.333 .5655
Agency/TA 5 .505 5.595 .9225
Munic/TA 10.012 13.492 .0001
Fed Funds/TA 3 .512 3.535 .9762
Loans/TA 58.761 54.322 .0125
Real Est/TA 20.922 21.453 .7674
Comm/TA 20.081 16.866 .0956
Consum/TA 19.144 15.949 .0294
Const/TA 1 .528 1.361 . 6499
Farm/TA 7 .535 8.935 .43 68
Dem Dep/TA 29.446 29.814 . 7833
Sav Dep/TA 21.901 22.825 .6187
Tot Time/TA 37.998 36.645 .5147
Equity/TA 7 .293 8 . 181 .0005
Loans/Dep 65.817 60.877 . 0122
Risky Ass/TA 42.878 39.038 . 1483
Total Assets 55,383,278 50,066,506 . 6004
Operating Rev 4, 643,063 3,973,126 .4549
ROA 0.859 0. 969 . 1689
ROE 11.764 11.523 .8118
Expenses/Revenue 86.223 84.629 .2356
Loan Loss/Loans 0.984 0. 978 .9360
Interest/Invest Sec 3.043 3 .203 .6590
Interest Paid 6.837 6 . 516 . 1680
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Moving to the second po'st-regulation year, not only 
were the observed changes in profitability during year one 
retained a certain amount of portfolio reshuffling has taken 
place The beginnings of a reversal in the federal funds 
investment policy appears as the mean for the regulated bank 
falls from 2.173 percent to 1.857 percent. Foreshadowing the 
results from t = 3,4, this shift in federal funds holdings 
continues until the mean holdings are approximately identical. 
Two other changes in investment policy occur between the 
first and second year. The regulated banks have increased 
investment in real estate loans and municipal securities.
As these changes relate to portfolio risk it would be safe 
to categorize real estate loans as a relatively high risk 
investment. In aggregate, the change in municipals would 
appear to imply lower risk. However, it is possible that 
the municipal securities selected by the regulated banks 
actually possess more risk relative to the unregulated 
banks' municipal portfolio. This municipal 
reshuffling argument is consistent with the results from 
t = 0 to t = 1 that revealed regulated banks increasing 
the yield from investment securities portfolio and will be 
tested further with the regression models.
Additional indications of increased asset portfolio 
risk through reshuffling are observed during years 3 and 4 
as the regulated banks increase their commercial and 
consumer loans. Coupled with the fact that regulated
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banks .also experienced increases in the return on assets 
and equity suggest evidence as to the direction of asset 
portfolio risk. This evidence is however not conclusive 
inasmuch as the regulated banks also became more efficient, 
reducing operating expenses, during this time period 
which may account for the rise in profitability.
Overall, the results of the univariate tests provide 
a solid foundation to suspect that a significant amount of 
reshuffling is occurring by the regulated sample.
Table 7 presents a summary of the findings of the univariate 
tests. Highlighted are the ratios which exhibited 
significant behavior in year 0 and years 1-4.
Proportional investments in assets catagories 
traditionally viewed as risky; real estate, commercial and 
consumer loans were on the rise by the regulated sample. 
Further, it is suggested that such an investment strategy 
viewed in light of increasing returns on assets and equity 
denotes that loan portfolios of regulated banks were 
becoming more risky. Also the investment securities 
portfolio provided some support for rejecting the null 
hypothesis of insignificant reshuffling by the regulated 
sample. It was observed that, while no implications can 
be drawn solely from the fact that regulated banks were 
increasing investment in municipal securities, the rise in 




Summary of Univariate Tests
Variable Year Pr > t Year Pr > t
Commercial/TA 0 .2765 4 . 0956
Consumer/TA 0 .8620 4 .0294
Federal Funds/TA 0 .0050 4 .9762
Return on Assets 0 .0160 4 . 1689
Return on Equity 0 .0156 4 .8118
Expense/Revenue 0 .0104 4 .2326
U.S. Securities/TA 0 .0420 1 . 6743
Int/Invest Sec. 0 .0389 2 .5862
The reshuffling hypothesis has not yet been formally 
tested because although "t" tests are sufficient for cross- 
sectional comparisons at each period, they are not suitable 
for time series applications. Direct comparisons of "t" 
statistics between t = 0 and t = 4 are not proper as the 
effect of time is not controlled. The univariate tests do 
provide: (1) insight into the regulators decision process
and interpretation of a bank possessing "inadequate capital" 
and (2) some preliminary indication of support of 
the reshuffling hypothesis which may prove useful
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in interpretation and subsequent empirical testing.
Multivariate Test
Test of Reshuffling Hypothesis
As pointed out, the preceding univariate testing of Eq. 
(61) does not permit any time-series comparisons of 
portfolio composition or profitability measures because of 
the inability of these to account for differences in the 
timing of observations. The use of multiple regression 
models to estimate relationships between variables overcomes 
this apparent weakness of the univariate tests. Properly 
specified, the coefficients from a multiple regession model 
measure the relationship between the dependent variable and 
the independent variable while holding the effects of the 
other independent variables constant.43 Thus (59) was chosen 
as an appropriate model for direct testing of the 
reshuffling hypothesis as it measures differences in assets 
holdings both across samples and between time periods. 
Further, and most fundamental to the testing of the 
reshuffling hypothesis is not whether regulated banks are 
changing the composition of their asset portfolio subsequent 
to capital regulation but how these changes differ from a 
sample of similar unregulated banks over the same time-
4 3 See the MANOVA test in the previous section for a




X i = constant + ^(Icode) +$2(Yr) + $3(Icode*Yr) +s^ 
where:
- percentage of total assets invested 
in asset i.
Yr - year subsequent to capital regulation, 0,1,2,3,4.
Icode- classification code
0 - bank required to increase capital
1 - bank was not required to increase capital
Initially, the portfolio composition and profitability 
variables from Table 5 were introduced into Eq. (59) as 
dependent variables and were regressed on sample affiliation 
(regulated or unregulated), year (t = 0,1,2,3,4), and an 
interaction term, (sample affiliation multiplied by year). 
As discussed previously, it is the interaction term which 
accounts for any differences in changes of portfolio 
holdings between groups over time. A positive value of the 
interaction coefficient, (53, would indicate that the 
unregulated sample increased its investment in asset i 
relative to the regulated sample during the post-regulation 
period. Conversely, g3 < 0 indicates that the regulated 
samples' holdings of asset i grew faster than the 
unregulated sample. Results of the regressions of Eq. (59) 
are presented in Table 8.
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TABLE 8
Results of Reshuffling Hypothesis Tests
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 0 through 4 
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Results of Tests of Reshuffling Hypothesis 
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 0 through 4 













Consumer/TA 3 .355 0.223 4.455 -0.970 92 .45
(.0001) (.8509) (.0001) (.0462) (.0001)
Constr/TA 0.403 -0.104 0.284 0.016 12.45
(.0081) (.6574) (.0001) (.8622) (.0001)
Farm/TA 8.213 1.488 -0.124 -0.023 1.205
(.0001) (.0293) (.7623) (.9623) (.3066)
Demand/TA 32.382 2.373 -0.753 -0.576 10. 98
( .0001) (.0171) (.0088) (.1558) (.0001)
Savings/TA 21.768 0. 748 0.218 0.065 0. 634
(.0001) (.5942) (.5954) (.9106) ( .5972)
Time/TA 45.747 1. 129 -2.403 -0.649 24.09
(.0001) (.4759) (.0001) (.3156) (.0001)
Equity/TA 6.307 1. 658 0.338 -0.296 38. 51
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Loans/Dep 65.876 -9.959 0. 103 1.298 27.28
(.0001) (.0001) (.8115) (.0353) (.0001)
Risk Ast/TA 51.628 -4.542 -1.665 0. 148 12 . 41
(.0001) (.0099) (.0001) (.8363) (.0001)
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Table 8 (contd.)
Results of Tests of Reshuffling Hypothesis 
Regulated vs. Unregulated Banks 
Year = 0 through 4 
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Not surprisingly, many of the changes in portfolio 
composition and profitability suggested by the univariate 
tests v/ere substantiated by the results of the regression 
model. In particular, nine variables exhibited statisticaly 
different behavior, at confidence levels between .01 
and .15, between the unregulated and regulated samples 
during the testing period:(prob > t in parentheses).
1. The regulated sample increased net balances of
federal funds, (.021).
2. The regulated sample reduced investment in 
total loans, (.104).
3. The regulated sample increased investment in 
consumer loans, (.046).
4. The regulated sample increased investment in 
municipal securities, (.143).
5. The regulated sample increased reliance upon demand
deposits as a source of funds, (.150).
6. The regulated sample increased yield on investment
securities portfolio, (.108).
7. The regulated sample increased return on 
earning assets, (.001).
8. The regulated sample increased efficiency
by reducing operating expense ratio relative 
to control group, (.055).
9. The regulated sample increased return 
on equity, (.036).
With respect to the reshuffling hypothesis, (59), the
regression results provide evidence as to the presence of
asset portfolio reshuffling. Initially the increase in
consumer lending appears to be the only evidence in support
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of rejecting the null hypothesis, i.e., no significant 
reshuffling into riskier assets. And in contrast, the 
findings of increased holdings of federal funds, reduction 
in total loans and increased investment in municipal 
securities lends - support for acceptance of the null 
hypothesis. In addition, as a result of capital regulation, 
the regulated banks appear to have become more operationally 
efficient and profitable. However, the link between asset 
reshuffling and portfolio risk lies not only in aggregate 
holdings of certain assets but the riskiness of the 
underlying loan or security. Thus, a closer inspection of 
the results is necessary before the net impact of the 
observed reshuffling upon portfolio risk can be determined.
Loan Portfolio Reshuffling
Proper evaluation of the riskiness of loan type 
requires specific data on the creditworthiness of a 
particular borrower on a loan by loan basis. However, this 
information was unavailable. Therefore, the fact that 
regulated banks reduced holdings of loans or for that matter 
increased investment in consumer loans does reflect on the 
reshuffling hypothesis, but provides no direct measure of 
the riskiness of the post-regulation asset portfolio. 
Further, the fact that the four other loan categories 
exhibited no significant differences in trends should not be
interpreted as to have no effect on portfolio risk. There 
is still the possibility that although proportional holdings 
in these loan catagories was unchanged, the riskiness of the 
specific loans could be significantly altered. Likewise, 
the observed increase in consumer loans could portray a 
reduction in risk if the underlying loans were themselves 
less risky. In an attempt to gain further insight into the 
riskiness of the loan categories, a regression of return on 
assets and the five loan categories was performed. Such a 
regression equation is based on the assumption that as the 
riskiness of the loan increases so will the rate charged on 
the loan. Therefore, an estimate of the relationship 
between ROA and a particular loan type should provide some 
evidence as to the riskiness of the loans made by the 
regulated or unregulated banks during the post-regulation 
period.
As in the case of the reshuffling tests a multiple 
regression model with an interaction term, which highlights 
the differences between samples, was selected.
ROA = a +f51(Icode)
+ (32 (Loan) +33 ( Icode*Loan) +s^ (63)
The mean values of ROA corresponding to the different values 
of the independent regressors are:
E(ROA|IC0DE=0) = a + 32 (Loan)
E(ROA|IC0DE=1) = (a + 3i) + (32 + 33)(Loan)
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The interpretations of the regression coefficients are as 
follows:
a = mean value of ROA for the regulated sample.
(a + 3i) - mean value of ROA for the unregulated sample.
$2 = estimate of the response in ROA due to a change 
in proportional investment in loan^.
f33 = estimate of the difference in the response in ROA 
to a proportional investment in loan^ by the
unregulated sample vis-a-vis the regulated sample. 
Practically speaking, the regression coefficients fS2 
and f33 are estimates of the marginal rates charged for loan 
type i. Viewed under a traditional risk-return framework a 
positive value for £3 would suggest an increase in loan 
portfolio risk by the unregulated sample vis-a-vis the 
regulated sample. Based on the results of testing the 
risk-return relationships, shown in Table 9, it appears that 
regulated banks charged higher rates on real estate and 
consumer loans than were the unregulated banks, $3 < 0 for 
both catagories. In turn, unregulated banks charged higher 
rates on commercial loans vis-a-vis the regulated sample, g3 
> 0 for commercial loans. If these findings are evaluated 
under the premise that higher rates imply greater risk then 
these results provide statistical evidence as to the 
acceptance or rejection of the reshuffling hypothesis. 
Increased portfolio risk is implied by the fact that 
regulated banks realized higher rates of return on their 
real estate and consumer loans. Conversely, a reduction in
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relative risk by the regulated group can be expected as a 
result of the lower rates charged for commercial loans.
It should be noted that, although a priori all 
estimates of $2 are expected to be positive, 32 f°r the 
commercial loan regression was negative, prob=.001. This 
implies that the sample of banks as a whole were charging 
lower rates as they made additional loans. Further data 
inspection did not uncover the source of this contrary 
result. Thus, the estimates from this equation must be 
interpreted with caution.44
As a means of determining the net effect of these 
findings, ROA was regressed, using (63), upon total loans. 
Here again the interaction term plays the critical role of 
measuring relative returns on total loans between the 
regulated and unregulated sample. The results of this 
regression suggest that for the overall loan portfolio the 
regulated banks increased returns at a faster rate than 
unregulated banks for a given level of investment in loans,
3 3 < 0 .
44 This "wrong sign" may be attributable to
multicollinearity between the independent variables. See 
Maddala (1977), pg. 185.
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TABLE 9
Results of Risk-Return Reshuffling of Loan Portfolio
Regulated vs. Unregulated 
(prob > It| in parentheses)






Cnsmer Icode*Cnsmer F-ratio 
0.0049 -0.0064 13.99
(.0914) (.0001)






Relest Icode*Relest F-ratio 
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(.0040) (.0001)




























































Therefore, it can be concluded that regulated banks did 
reshuffle its.loan portfolio in two ways:
1 . by increasing total consumer loans, as a 
percentage of total assets faster than 
unregulated banks and
2 . internal reshuffling took place within real estate, 
consumer,and commercial categories, with a tendency to 
invest in higher-yielding higher-risk loans. Based on 
the results of Table 9, the overall tendency of this 
internal reshuffling was to invest in higher-yielding, 
higher-risk loans
The same yield-risk relationship is applied when 
interpreting the behavior of the investment securities 
portfolio. Traditional analysis would interpret increased 
investment in investment grade securities as risk reducing 
based upon the general perception of the default risk of the 
issuer. However, two facts preclude such a conclusion. 
First, of the three categories of investment securities in 
which banks actively trade, U.S. securities, agency 
securities and municipals, municipal securities are riskier 
in terms of default risk, for example, New York City and 
WPPSS bonds. And as shown in Table 8 regulated banks 
significantly increased the rate of investment in municipal 
securities during the post-regulation period. Secondly, by 
appealing to the arguments outlined in the discussion of 
loan portfolio reshuffling, the fact that regulated banks 
have increased their yields on' investment securities at a 
significantly (prob=.108) faster rate than the unregulated 
sample, may in turn imply an internal reshuffling of the
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investment portfolio. Even' though relative investment in 
investment securities has risen, it may be argued that in 
order for the regulated bank to earn significantly higher 
yields it must purchase riskier securities.
Thus, it appears that the results from Tables 6-9 
provide evidence in support of rejecting the null hypothesis 
that changes in the asset portfolio characteristics of 
regulated and unregulated banks were insignificant. On the 
liabilities side, it was found that the regulated bank 
restructured its financing resources. As shown by Table 8 , 
the regulated bank relied more heavily on demand deposits as 
a source of funds. While this change was found to be
statistically significant its impact upon portfolio risk and 
upon default risk would be speculation at most.
In conclusion, based upon the univariate and 
multivariate tests there appears to be sufficient evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis and accept the hypothesis that 
in response to mandated capital regulation, banks will 
reshuffle their asset portfolio. This resultant 
post-regulation asset portfolio will be composed of more 
risky assets which could result in a higher probability of 
default for a regulated bank.
Additional Assumptions of the Model
In addition to the basic assumptions of the
2classical linear regression model, i.e., e^ N(0,o ) and 
E(E^Ej)=0 , i*j/ the reshuffling test equation also 
incorporates an assumption regarding the variable YR. As 
discussed, the coefficient of YR from (59) is interpreted as 
the rate of change in a financial variable for the four 
years following capital regulation. However, implicit in 
the model's design is the assumption that this estimated 
change is uniform or equal change across the test period.45 
For example, in reaction to capital regulation a bank may 
react sharply and make adjustments in the first year and 
remain at that position throughout the test period. In this 
case, the possibility exist that such an adjustment by the 
bank may be undetected by the original model due to a 
smoothing of information over the test period. That is, a 
significant reaction in period one may be washed out by 
similar behavior between the matched pairs in periods 2,3 
and 4.
Thus, to test this uniformity assumption and to gain 
further insight into the adjustment process by regulated 
banks, the following regression was run:
45 See Kmenta (1971), pg. 413 for a discussion of this 
assumption.
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X± = a + Pi(ICODE) + B2(YR1) + 3 3(YR2) + 34(YR3)
+ 35(YR4) + 3S(YR1*IC0DE) + p7(YR2*ICODE) (59.1)
+ 3S(YR3*ICODE) + 39(YR4*ICODE)
The mean values of corresponding to different values of 
the independent variables are:
E(Xi/ICODE=0) = a + fr2 (YRl) + B3(YR2) + B4(YR3) + 35(YR4) 
E(Xi/ICODE=l) = (a+Bi) + (32+36)(YRl) + (B3+37)(YR2)
+ (B^+B8)(YR3) + (B5+69)(YR4)
where:
a = mean value of X^ for the regulated sample, yr=0 .
(o+Bi) = mean value of X^ for the unregulated sample, yr=0 .
3^,i=2, 3,4,5 = estimate of the change in the mean of X^
from the year of capital regulation, t 0, 
to year t  ̂̂ .
3^,i=6,7,8,9 = estimate of the difference in the change in
the mean of X^ for the unregulated sample
from the year of capital regulation, t0,
to year t , . . .J (1-5)
Results of the regressions estimates from (59.1) 
indicate the assumption of a uniform rate of change in X^ 
between each year after regulation is appropriate, i.e. 3s 
- 3g were found to be not significantly different from zero 
at the .01 level except for Ratio6, Net Federal Funds and 
Ratio26, Interest on Bonds, Notes and Securities/ Investment 
Securities. In the case of Ratio26 the difference in slopes 
was significant in each year at the .05 level and for 
Ratio6, year four, 3g, was significant at the .05 level. 
Thus, it appears that (59) is appropriate for testing the
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reshuffling hypothesis and, in addition, the reaction by 
banks to capital regulation followed a smooth rather than a 
jump process. Such a result may be expected if regulated 
banks felt that regulators were now monitoring their actions 
more closely. And that any abnormal activity by the bank may 
result in additional examination and regulation.
Default-Risk Hypothesis
The second major hypothesis to be tested centers around 
the relationship between asset portfolio reshuffling and 
probability of default risk. As shown by Swary (1980), 
Edwards and Scott (1976), and Koehn and Santomero (1980), 
the ability of capital regulation to alter default risk can 
be expressed both mathematically and graphically. Simply, 
additional capital can reduce the probability of default by 
providing a higher equity threshold from which bankruptcy is 
defined. The regulated institution which now has a greater 
cushion of equity to operate with will be able to withstand 
higher levels of operating losses and/or asset devaluations. 
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, increases in capital will 
result in lower probability of failure, holding other 
factors constant. The problem arises, however, when a 
regulated bank alters its returns distribution by 
reshuffling the asset portfolio. In particular, as 
exhibited in Figure 2 such a change in investment strategy
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could result in a risk-return locus which possesses default 
risk contrary to regulators intent. The empirical question 
then becomes, whether as a result of asset portfolio 
reshuffling following capital regulation, does the regulated 
bank improve or deteriorate its risk-return locus vis-a-vis 
an unregulated bank?
Using the same 79-bank sample used in the reshuffling 
tests, (62) was employed to measure the effect of assets 
portfolio reshuffling upon default risk for regulated 
banks.4 6
ROA = a + Pi (Icode) + $2(Risk) + fj 3 (I code*Ri sk)
Introduced as portfolio risk proxies were:
1. Riskl= Coefficient of Variation of Net Income.
2. Risk2= Variance of Return on Assets(ROA).
3. Risk3= Coefficient of Variation of ROA.
4. Risk4= Chebyshev's Inequality.
Average net income for the post regulation period, 
yr=l,2,3,4, was the dependent variable used as the portfolio 
return proxy regressed on Riskl. Average return on assets 
for the post regulation period, yr=l,2,3,4 was the 
corresponding return proxy associated with the other risk 
measures.
46 A similar application of this model is found in D'Antonio 
and Melchier (1979).
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Interpretation of the regression results follows that 
of the reshuffling tests, where the coefficient of the 
interaction term f$3 represents the difference in behavior 
between the regulated and unregulated sample with respect to 
default risk. A significant positive sign for 3S would 
imply that regulated banks were increasing their probability 
of default faster than the unregulated sample over the 
testing period. A significant negative sign for the 
interaction term notes a reduction in default risk 
probability by the regulated banks relative to the 
unregulated sample.
The results of the default-risk hypothesis tests are 
given in Table 10.
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TABLE 10
Regression Results of Default-Risk Hypothesis
Regulated vs. Unregulated 














































ROA = Constant Icode Risk4 Icode*Risk4 F-ratio
0.9429 0.1556 -0.00019 -0.000394 16.68
(.0001) (.0069) (.0001) (.0023) (.0001)
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Two significant conclusions can be reached from 
the above results:
1. For all risk proxies tested, the sign of the 
interaction term is negative and three of the four 
coefficients are statistically significant, 33 <0. 
This implies that the unregulated banks v/ere 
increasing their probability of default 
relative to the regulated bank sample.
2. For two overall risk proxies, Risk2 and Risk4, the 
signs of the coefficients were negative, 32 <0- 
And, in addition, observing that (32 + P3) is 
negative for each regression equation implies a 
negative relationship between risk and return
for the unregulated sample over the entire time 
period.
The fact that 33 was consistently negative would appear 
to be inconsistent with the results of the reshuffling 
tests. Where it was concluded that regulated banks were 
indeed reshuffling their asset portfolios investing in more 
risky assets. This did not, however, require a 
corresponding increase in the probability of default for 
such a bank. A reconciliation of these findings is provided 
from the additional result that these same banks were 
realizing higher return from investments and becoming more 
operationally efficient. Therefore as shown by the default 
risk tests, the net effect of both risk and return increases 
by the regulated bank sample has actually resulted in a 
higher return-risk locus, i.e., return is increasing faster 
than risk. This in turn implies a lowering of default 
probability by the regulated banks relative to the 
unregulated sample.
1 2 1
The second point addresses the issue of the "soundness" 
of the banking industry. A priori, a positive relationship 
between risk and return is expected, but such was not the 
case for the sample of banks in this study.. Instead the 
observed negative sign for &z and (fh + S3) both suggest 
that over the time period tested, the banking industry or a 
sector of the industry represented by this sample has become 
more risky, increasing its probability of default. 
Considering, however, the time period under study, 
1972-1981, with its severe economic swings and volatile 
interest rates, such a result may be hardly surprising or 
unexpected.
In conclusion,, the results of the default-risk tests 
support accepting the null hypothesis that regulated banks 
do not increase default risk as a result of capital 
regulation. In fact, the impact of capital actually appears 
to result in a reduction of default probability and more 
efficiently managed commercial banks.
I
Chapter VI 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
In order to understand the interrelationship between 
bank capital regulation and the decision-making process of a 
commercial bank, several models of the banking firm were 
analyzed and discussed. Ranging from Swary's constrained 
optimization framework to O'Hara's dynamic modelling, there 
is substantial theoretical justification to suspect that 
banks will reshuffle their asset portfolio in response to a 
regulated increase in equity capital. As a result, the bank 
will possess a riskier asset portfolio, which, in turn, may 
imply an increase in the bank's probability of default.
Empirical testing of the reshuffling hypothesis and the 
corresponding default-risk hypothesis was performed using a 
test sample of banks which, from 1972-1977, were ordered by 
regulators to increase their equity capital. Due to the 
small asset size of the banks forced to increase equity 
capital, no market price data were available for testing. 
Therefore, both univariate and multivariate testing were 
designed using a peer group (a sample of similar banks that 
did not experience a regulated capital structure shift) as a 
benchmark or control sample with which to compare and 
contrast the behavior of the test sample. Differences or 
similarities between these two groups were measured relative 
to various balance sheet and income statement ratios which
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served as proxies for asset' portfolio holdings and asset 
risk measures.
Results of the empirical tests provide tentative 
evidence that, in reaction to a regulated increase in equity 
capital, banks will reshuffle their asset portfolios and/or 
alter their profitability and operating characteristics. 
Specifically, it was found that, in contrast to the control 
sample, such banks:
1. Reshuffle their asset portfolio by increasing net 
balances of federal funds, increasing investment in 
municipal securities and consumer loans and 
increasing the use of demand deposits.
2. Significantly increase average yields on investment 
securities portfolio, return on equity and return on 
total assets.
3. Become more operationally efficient by reducing their 
operating expense to operating income.
Further, there is evidence that these same banks are 
internally reshuffling their loan portfolios. Under the 
assumption that higher returns imply increasing risk, the 
results of the loan portfolio reshuffling indicate a 
tendency for the test sample to make riskier real estate and 
commercial loans and, also, to increase the overall risk of 
the loan portfolio.
Finally, the default risk hypothesis was tested by 
comparing changes in the risk-return locus of the test and 
control samples. The resultant default-risk levels of the 
test sample were found to be decreasing relative to the
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control sample. Reconciliation of the reshuffling and 
default-risk tests suggest that any observed increase in 
portfolio risk by banks forced to increase equity is being 
dominated by the corresponding increase in operating 
efficiency.
Therefore, it appears that the effects of a regulated 
increase in equity capital upon the decision-making process 
of the commercial bank are two-fold:
1. banks will respond by reshuffling their asset 
portfolio selecting a riskier portfolio than would be 
expected, and
2 . banks become more operationally efficient,
the net result being a reduction in default-risk vis-a-vis 
banks not subject to regulated increases in equity capital. 
Thus, if it is generally agreed that the objective of 
capital regulation is to improve the riskiness of banking 
system the evidence lends support to the premise that 
regulatory actions are indeed effective and successful.
The scope of the results is limited by sample 
characteristics and data constraints. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the screening process for inclusion in the test 
sample yielded relatively small banks - average total assets 
of $34,000,000. Thus, the application of any empirical 
results to large banks is questionable. Also the possible 
shortcomings of the data base must be considered. First, 
the use of book values instead of market or economic values
125
of the asset and liabilities variables for testing 
introduces possible valuation errors. Second, results based 
on only four years of data subsequent to the regulation and 
the absence of any pre-regulatory data surely restricts the 
power of the statistical models.
Much more work, both theoretical and empirical must be 
done in the area of capital regulation before its full 
impact on the behavior of the bank becomes clear. As the 
dynamics of the banking firm are more clearly understood, 
and as data becomes more accessible and accurate, further 
insights into the effectiveness and efficiency of capital 
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11 0 0 0 3 * 9 0 7 9  
10 O I2 2 3 3 3 7 7 0 0 9 9  
9  0 1 1 * 0 7 9  
•  11 2 2 2 2 * 0 7 7  
7 1 2 3 * 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 9  
0  23 3 0 0  
3  0 9
•MVCSTMIRI S tC U R IIIC S /rO IA L  A 99C19 
UR I VAR I A IC STA TISTICS 
» fA *  I 0  
RCCULAltO 3AMRLC
Q U A R TILCSfO ft**}
M<AR 
SIO  o t v  
s a c w R ts s  
u s *
CV
1 Mf AM«0 
SON RARR 
RUM •»  0 
O'RORMAL
79
7 7 .* 1 0  
0 .0 * 9 9 9  
•0 .0 2 0 9 7 * 7  
0JO W 7.0 
2 9 .9 0 3 0  








SIO  MfAR 
* * 0 8 * I 1 I 
RROR*IS I0. OR] 1 ftA1 
SICM L fA l *2 0 *0 3*
30 3
30 0 7 1 0 0  
3ft 0 * 0 7 9 0 9  
32 12903 
3 0  0 9 7 9  
2 0  0 0 1 1 3 3 * 0  
2 0  0 0 3 * 9 3 0 0 0 1 7 9 9  
2ft 7 0 9 * 0 9 9 0 0 7 * 9  
22 2 079  
20  3070 9 0  
■ 0 9 9 0  
10 9 0 7  




2 1 0 0 .0 2  
* 0 .9 2 2 *  
O .2 4 /A 0 1  
1 0 9 9 .9 9  
0 .7 7 0 0 0 *  
0 .0 0 0 1  
0 . orx>«
>0. 19
*00 1  HAR 
731  03 
3 0 1  M tn 
2 9 1  Ql 
0 1  RIR
* 3 .0 1  
3 2 .2 9  
2 0 .0 3  
23 00  
1 I 00
3 1 .3 3
9 .9 9




* 3 .0 1  
3 9 . 19 
3 0 .0 7  
1 7 .7 *  
1 9 0 1  
1 1 .6 0
1 2 .9 7  
1* . 99
1 3 .0 1
1 9 .0 2
RfCRrsi 
3 7 .9 9  
3 9 . 39 
* 0 .9 *
RORMAL RRORAI
U .S . 3CCW M11 (9 7 1 0 7 A t A 9 S (I9
im tV A R iA tc  s t a t i s t i c s  
v (A * •  o  
RCOU IA ltO  SAMRtt
« 7 A R t l t C S m i < f t |
MTAR




0 .0 9 0 0 1
1. 100*2
1. 19A I 
1 0 2 9 * .0  
0 0 .* 0 0 7  









■ U R I09 I9
CSS
S t o  MfAR 
W 1O 0»|1 I 
r R o R * u |
79
7R 2-99  
9 1 .2 7 1 0  
l . 39103  
3 9 9 9 .1 0  
0 .* 0 9 0 1 
9 .0 0 0 1  
0 n o n  I
• 0 0 t  mar 
191  Ql 
5 0 1  »tf> 
2 3 1  Ql
1 2 .9  7 1261 






3 2 .9 7  
71* 27 
1 0 .9 0  
0 .9 9  
i 0 9 9 9 * 9 9
MlCMfST 
2 3 .2 1  
2 f t .27 
2ft 0 7 
29 . 77 





2 0  2 
I*  90 
10 l i f t*
I *  3*39 
12 3091 
10 33*20  
0 1 1 3 * 9 0 0 1 )3 0  
0 11**9 0 0 1 1 9 9  
•  1 )0 0 7 9 9  
2  0 0 )9 0 0 7 0 0 1  1971 
0  0 0 0  I 3990R9
133
m ? A t M V I 1
c u t  A r r o  s a n a i r
m .* *
SIO  o t v
u s s
CV
I t M t l ' O  
SOU MANN





5 5 6 0 / S  
S . f 9 0 6 6  
2 . t  M R / 
6 0 5 / . 3 6  
1 2 1 .6 0  
7 .) 0 * S 6  
IO I 7 .5  
65
0 . 20S 8A / 
U A »
5 /





SIO  - t* R  
M 0 8 > l M 





5 . J 5 I 9 6  
1 5 9 6 .a ?  
o .  t t u n o i  
o .o o o i  
n .n n r n
' 0 . 0 1
100% HA* JO. 7*
'5%  Q) 7 .6 *
50% Nff> 2 .1 5
>5% 01 1
0% MIR <1
RAmCC j o . ;*






* 1 .5 6  
? J . 1 9  
2 * . 9 
1 0 .9 9  
JO . /9
t 0 /8 * 9  
I 9 5 )
I 999
I 0 1 1 1 /1 ) 5 6 7 /I 66099969 
! 0 1 5 ) 9 6 6 / 7 / 9 0 ? ) )




S I A t t  6  R H lH C A l  9I/90IV ISIO M S SICURI » U S / * 0 1 Al. M S fT J  
URIVAR IA I% S / A I 'S / I C S
VfAR ■ O
■ C C taA K O  5AM71 f
Qt/AMMICSI 0 7 7 - 9 1
MCA*
s / o  o t v
U ( W ( »
u s s
CV
T: M7 AN-0 
SUM RANK 
RUM •«  0  
OtMORMAI
/9
1 0 .1 6 1 9  
5 .5 0 /1 9  
0 .6 9 6 6 1 *  
1 0 9 5 5 .a  
5 * .0 6 9 5  
* 6 .9 ) ? *  




a u m o s i s
c s s
S 'O  " M R
W 108»IM
R * 0 * » 1 S |
7 * 0 0 * 0
19
9 0 9 . S I  
5 0 . J5 0 6  
O .9 6 0 8 9 9  
2 ) 6 9 . 6  
0 .6 1 9 6 2 *  
0 .0 0 0 1  
0 .0 0 0 1
* 0 . 15
t o o l  HA* 





0 5 - 0 1Moot
2 6 . 0 /
l) .< J6





2 8 . 0 /  
16. I I  
* 6 - 9 1 
* 0 9
m c w s r
I 7 .9 2  
1 8 .5 1  
2 2 . 19 
2 5 .6 9  
2 8 . 0 /




1* 1 2 * 91257  
I ?  5 9 0 0 2 * 5  
10 I2 M 5 5 5 6 U 5 N 9
1 1 ? S ? 2 )* * 6 9
6  1 1 )1 1 5 /6 1 2 2 6 * 6  
•  111 1*1*66
2  96
0  0 0 * 9 *
R f 7 7 ( 0 t« A l  /IIR O S/IO IA L  *• 
UWtVA*1 A l t  51 At 1*1 ICS 
yf  A* •  0
R fC U lA /rf t SAM71 f
01/AM f I L t 51 O t 7 - *  1
Mt AN
S / o  o c v
I M W f S S
u s s
cv
f * MfAR-0 
SRH AAN* 
RUM - •  0
0 ! RORMAl
79
2 .* 0 ) 5 *  
* .1 0 5 1 2  
0 .* 7 9 6 ) 6  
I9 Q 2 .0 *  
1 / 9 . 1 15 
1 9 6 2 2 /  
a m . 5 
r )
0 .  102**6 
S 1 l »  IIA 7  16 9
SUN u r n s
SUM
VARIANCC
* 0 * 1 0 5 1 5
CS6
S t o  M(A* 
7 * 0 6 » I  11 
7 * 0 « M S »
7R0*»O
19
1 6 9 .6 6  
* 6 .5 1 *  
I .  ' 5 ) ) /  
1 * * 8 .6 8  
0 .  * A * )6 )  
0 .0 0 0 1  
o .o o o i
0 . 0 ) 9
AAM6C
0 5 -0 1
MOOt
» 6 .5 *  
* .* *  2 2
0





• 5 .  75 
- 5 .6 6  
- *  5
MORMAt. 7 * 0 * A * I( .I?V  7 (0 1
H  . *6 
I I .  99 
18. 5*
10 01 
9 2 5 6  6 2?/
6 *86
5 0 2 2  « 2***66*
)  0 2 ) 6 / 9  
2 2 7 * * * 9 5 /1 * 9  
I 0 ) 5 5 /7 9  
0  2 5 6 6 /7 7 /9 9 9  
• 0  96IOOOOOO 
- I  m  •2 /)
• )  06 




•OIAI LOAN3/tOI*l *13113 
UNIVARIAIC SMIIItlCS 
r?AR ■ 0
r c c u i a u o  sa m r i c







RUN •• 0 
O'RORHAi
I f
9 8 ,0 9 3 4  
f . 16866  
• 0 .6 0 0 J 1  27)907 
I I . 1600 
1 1 .9 9 0 6  
'9 8 0  
I f0.000001?
SU M  U A I  
i*  u ? r  
12 9 
IQ I t * '
4 9  0 ) 6  66 1440
61  t9 9 4 7 R
6 2  5 5 5 1 ?
6 0  2 6 0 4 5 3 6 6 7 7  
54 0 1 4 * 3 0 4 4 * 0 ?  
36  217 3  
3 »  3 5 9  
32  37 6 7 7  
30  1 2 3 6 7 8 )
64 69 
6 6  1 ) 3 8  
66  2 62 R2 
60 
39
su n  w o ts
SUM
VARIANCC 
nun  m s  i s  
CSS








1 .0 3 6 )  | 
0 .0 0 0 1  
o.noot
0 .  1 16
QUANIHtSIOC?*11 7818CH7S
1001 MAR 79.47 991 19 67 10V7Sf
191 0) 66. 9) 951 72 74 79. 06
301 Mtn 39.42 9<>1 70- 13 13.80
791 01 31 )Z 101 *4.20 JA.2
n t  m in 29. 0A 91 17.91 17.91











RCAl CStAtC LOANS/707AL ASSCIS 
UNIVAR IAt C SIAIIJtlCS 
















0:NO*N*t 0. 11 79<3
S U M  It AC 
II 9
) •  46 
19 491* 6 
J2
30 469  
74  90 
2 6  0 ) 9
2 6  I I I 7 8 I I A 9  
2 2  79 
7 0  36 
14 239
16 1113 6 8 9 7 9  
16 7 1 )9 8  
12 4 9 7 6 6 6 9  
10 1491 6 7 7 7 8  
9 3 )6 6 4  


























6 5 .6 9  
26.4 
• 6.09 











30 . '4  
11.46 







CINMCNCIAl tOARS/fOlAt A9SC73 
UNIVARIA f C SIA7ISIICS 
< C «  •  0 
•CGUIAI7D SAMPLC
Q U A N ii t r s ( o c r « 6 i
■CAN»10 ocv
• K W f S S
US1
I f











310 **C AN 




• 6 0 9 .6 )  
1A 7 .9 9 9  
I .  1 6 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 ) .9  
» .4 5 0 2 0  
0 -0 0 0 1  
0 .0 0 0 1
o oio
• o o f  MAH 
111  Q) 
) 0 |  MCO 
7 3 1  Ql 


















lo w e s t  
I 99 
2 .0 5 4 3 . 79 
49.01 
3 0 .  13 
1 4 .9
NO*MAI. RNONAR 11.1IV PIOT
4 69  
4 01
1 46 6 4 ?
)  0 0 1 ) 3
2 5 6 7 7 8 9  
7 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 ) 1 )4 *
1 3 3 9 6 6 7  7777 0 8 4 9 6  
I 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 6 6  
0  3 5 9 6 7 7 1 1 8 8 0 8 9 9  0 726
H U tt lP f *  SU M . i f  Af 9V <0




) » .9 »
I• 7 9«
I
7 .5 *  '
><V9l*0*i 1 * **0*
( 2 * 0 t  
19  9* 
t (  '» ■




i s j a o i
ec /• 






29  6 ftl *[21 11 
2b 12 




i t - r b
30M99
HIM ( 0
ID i n  0)« tOt 
f b  1 6 /  mr* too i
6 i  o«
lt*00  0 
lOOO'O 
2 * / Bi 0  
(9*02VC 
6 0 1 6 9 2 '0  (296’6* 
6 0 * 9 1 6 2  
61
0< 909<
1 (1 < 9 0 * 4  111<90*6 
H»6m O K  
SCO 
d k u i a n i  
33M9IVVA MAS 
S lIM  MIS
< *1 22 Bi 
11 02 
9*1 22 
9 9 (0 1  *2 
6 * B t (0 2  *2  
6 * 1 2 6 * 0  12 
6 1 * * 6 6 1 1 6 *  Of 
6 l 6 0 6 9 * f ( 2 l  I 2 f  
6 * 1 6 ( 2  • (  
9 9 6 * 6 2 0  9 (  





<*11 M ) i (  
2 9 1 2 9 6 0 * 0  6/
06*1 121* I*
6 2 9 *  12 
1 * (2 9 1 9  
l ( 0 0 1 2 'o  
6 1 9 6 6 V  
1 6 0 9 '2 t
61
0  • -  MMf 
*■ 9*  M9S 
o « i r * i9 : i 
AO *66 KlMXt 
A )0  O K  
■ 9 j9
I *»<  JO  I t  1 M 1*9/10
1 )<MV* U IJ9 1 A 0 2 *0 • NVJA
S 3  I 1 * 1 | 9 | S  3 1 9 1 8VA1M/1 
S l J S t *  1 * 1 0 1 /* ! 1 ( 0 * 3 0  0N9M10
AB 1 911  M ilh  A U l i
2* *6 
99 * 1 *  20 I*6* 9(
12  62 
IS lH O lH
I9W0M 1 9 * 9 0 9
Co ' £2 
9 6 9 *  *91 
2* * 9 6
aooM
I D - ( 0
30 * 9 9
"lb ?62 0)M lOt 
( b  1 6 /  
K9M to o I
1 0 0 *
1000 0 1000*0 (*6*2 * I 
6 6 ’ (0 9 6  
66V 6* * * •21*(2i
6 6 * 6 9 9
61
0 « 9 0 M







S lp f t  MIS
C222IOOO |
6 6 9 6 9  I *((221 I 6 2 
9  I (
*1 9 fe
9 6 
< 9 ) 1  M i l t  
* 2 1 0 ( 2 * 0  IVMtfONiO
( 9  (  MM
6001 BM99 K K
(9 6 * 6 * 9  0«MV3tf‘ l
9 6 1 * 6 (1  
9 ’6 /6 * 1  
6 V 0 0 0 ‘2 
(9 6 0 * 1 1  
1 0 2 1 1 * 9  
61
(SO  
( t ) M l l l  
A30 O iS
t* > J 3 a iE ) l t lM 9 / iD
) ) * » • (  O JiV V tO )*
0  ■ 99 )A
S O i l t l t V K  3 J 9 199AIM/I 
S 1 3 S 6 t  l* 1 0 l/S M 9 0 1  M 09I
S J H U 0 3  2  0 1  2/1 J M J S 3 U 2 J 0  A9K •
J O l J  A l l l l U V U i lU J  1VHUON
O o * 9on*2
I l f  *2 09 * I 00* 1 
J S l i l l )  III
0
l S J n o i
VI666/>f * 
6*51
3 iXC otot yi*too ,;ir166 ‘.*1
1 6 6  m i
I V I H l b J  I t  INVJIO
3Q0H
t o - r n
J3I/VU
N IH  10 
I t )  lit 
0 1 H  tO C  fb V.t 
KVH tO O l
yzooi *i 
2 6 [ * 0 1 2  Miiyie 
666/*2
WV IN O IS  
S S 3  SISOIMOM 
3:>NVIUVA
f i 6 y f i ) * o  i v h u o v o(ti 4*09 
6U ‘/8 2 * 2
9 6 / * o e tWOtlZ 
9 fj 2 i  'S  
6 2 C / V 1  
0 1 0 ( 9 * 0  
61
U -*
XNOU NOS 0»hvjh:i 
A 3 
S S .l 
S S lH rtiM S  
A 'iO O IS  NVJH
I i i i u v s  t n i v i n o t u
II 119 |A 
S.*) I I S !  I VI (. 1 1VI HVAI III)
S I J S S V  I*  | i  11 /S N V ll I n o t  U l i l l lS N O J
sex









PI ^  
i | !  S i m
i l l  i
*1:
;:
i -  : *ii
•;-£












I I !  I
S  III
137
j o t a l  L O A N s / io f A t  n r r o s i r s
UN I VAR I AT£ 6 I A I I S 7 I C S  
YEAR “ u 
ftCG U LA U O  SA H H  £
MEAN 




T :M C A N -0 
SON RANK
HUM *« 0  
0 : NORMAL
7966. io5) 11.7U12 
- 0 .  1 'i*>228
355*776 
1 7 . 7 0  IN 
5 0 .0023 
1 5 0 0  
79
s u m  w a r s
SUM
VARIANCE
M IM IO S IS
c s s
S IU  MEAN
p n o n > {  11 
r w m > i s i
0 .f l i i3 l> 2 5 3  
SIC M  LEAP 
9  0  
9  0  A 616 om?3h
7 5 6 6 A 9 9 ?
7 0 0 0 1 I I ? ? | J J 3 J » ,6 5 5 5 6 6 /7 7 a A 0 0 9 9  
6  0 0 1 1 2 2 2 ) 3 3 3 ) j i |  
5  6 0 6 7 7 7 / 9  
5  0 0 0 0 2 J 9  •* 1 
9 I I
A R nn> o
79
5 2 2 2 . 3 2  
U 7 . 6 9 6  
O .U V 9 3 V 6 '!  
1 0 7 9 2 .n 
I .3 2 U 9 9  
o . n o o i  
o . o o m
>0.15
l o o t  MAX 
75X  Q3 
5 0 X  MCI) 
2 5 t  01  
O t  MIN
RANOf
Q 3 -Q I
M oor






9 5 . 6 9  
7 2 .9 1  
6 6 . 75 
9 6 .  59  
36  2 7
5 7 .5 7
1 1 .3 2
3 0 .2 7
9 5 .  OR l o w e s t
8 5 .  72 3 8 .2 7
0 1 . 2 0 3 9 .  15
5 0 . 2 N 1 .0 3
9 1 . 2 '1 1 .2
3 0 . 2 7 '1 7 . 1
NORMAL PR O B A B IL IT Y  PLOT
MIGHT ST 
8 1 .2 1  
8 5 .  72 
00.66 
0 9 . 6 6  
9 5 . 0 9
M U LTIPLY  S IE M .L C A f BY I O * « M lt
R ISK Y  A S S T IS /I O I A I  A S S M S  
i m i v A R iA ic  s i a i i s t i c s  
VI.A ll -  II 
R F ftU IA T IO  SAHPI E
O U A N T IL C S (O C T -9 )
H f  AN




I : Mf AN^O 
SCN RANK 
NUM - •  U 
Os NORMAL
79
9 9 . 7H3 7 
1 1 .8 9 1 3  
• 0 . 3 1 0 1 5 2  
2 0 6 1 0 )  
2 3 . 6 2 3 6  
3 7 . 3 0 0  




VAN I AMCC 
K U IIIO S IS
C S S
S i n  MIAN 
r « o n > i  11 
p i i o i u i s i
0 . 0 7 1 9 9  
S U M  I I AT 
7 199 
6 5 6  7
6  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 3 9  
5  5 6  7 7 7 7 6 0 9 9 9  
5  0 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 ) 3 9 9 9  
9  5 5 5 6 6 6 7 9 9 9 9 9 9  
9  0 1 3 ) 9 9  
3 5 7 0 6 9 9 9  
3 1 2 2 3 3 9 9  
2  6 9  
2  0 9  1
PII0I1»0
7 9
3 9 2 6 .5 9  
1 9 0 .2 1 7  
- 0 . 3 3 9 9 5 7  
1 0 9 3 6 .9  
1 . ) 3 2 2 5  
O .6 0 0 1  
0 . 0 0 0 1
> 0 . 15
MULI I Pl.V  S U M . L I AT BY
1 0 0 S  MAX 
7 5 t  Q i 
S o t  M en 





7 9 .  I I  
5 6 . 0  
5 1 . 5 7  
9 0 . 5 6  
1 9 . 76
5 9 .3 3  
1 6 .2 2  
9 9 .  79









7 9 .  1 1 
6 7 . 2  
6 3 .  39 
3 3 . 0 2  
2 9 . 2 6  
1 9 . 78
LOWEST 
1 9 .  78 
2 3 . 5 9  
2 6 . 2 8  
2 9 . 2 6  
3 0 . 9
NORMAL PR O B A B IL IT Y  PLOT
|  •  • • • •
|  . . . . . .I ♦ ••I ♦ •
1 7 .5 *  •
• 7  - 1  * n  » t
6 7 . 2  
7 0 . 9 9  
7 9 . 0 3  
7 9 .  1 1
101*1 * 3 1113  
UMIVARIAIC S I A I M f lC  
*TA« •  0 
A fC V LA U o SAN2I (
Q U A N T IL C SIorr-M
1*
m e * ,  i 
6 8 1 6 0 .2  
5 .1 9 0 2 5  
9 .8 8 J T * ! !  
1 7 7 .6 9 6  
5 .  19672 
1330
I : HrANaO
0 .3 0 7 7 3 1
SUM WGIS 79 l o o t  MAI * 6 )1 3 7
SUM 3 1 2 7 1 9 ) 131  0 ) *3223
VARIANCE 9 6 7 )1 2 1 1 7 7 3 0 1  NED 200*3
*17*703 13 2 8 .1 3 6 ) 2 5 1  01 11616
CSS 3 .6 9 3 C H I O f HIM 513*
SID NCAN 7 6 9 1 . I J
T A O O rlll 0 .0 0 0 1 RANGE *380 0 3
MtOR>IS) 0 .0 0 0 1 0 3 -0 1 11609
m o c 313*
9 7001N
MIX)»f» < 0 .0 1
t  80 * 2 1 0 7  
1 •
1 1739359923*1969 
I 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 9 1 6 0 1 1) 6 7 769 
i 566 7 7 7 8 9 9 0 0 0 0 111M  1 2 2 ) 3 )9 * 9 3 6 7 7 7  78699
MUlflALY 9 U N  LtAT 8Y 10***0A
9 6 )1 3 7  
* 10679  
60337  
43 7) 







MICHE 3 1 
1 10998  
110629  
• 1 9 3 ) 3  
9 0 9 * 2 2  
* 6 ) 1 3 7
1 3 8
10TAL O rCM M M O  »CVtNUt 
(m <VAKIAK S I A U S t lC S  
YCA* •  0
■c c u l a ic p  s a m h c
MCAM
s i o  o r v  
m w c n  
u s s  
c v
?:HtA*N-« 
s o n  * * * «  
NUH •«  0
9 u *  l c a p




2 8 U .3 4  
* 8 6 6 .0 2  
9 .2 2 9 9 7  
2 9 7 2 2 7 9 9 * 1  
1 1 2 .9 * 4  
9 .< 1 9 2 *  
•9 8 0
79
0 .  J0 9 > 7 8
SUN UGT9 79
SUM 2 2 2 2 7 3
VARIANCE 2 3 8 7 9 1 9 8
M /R 104IS  2 9 .2 9 * 6
CSS > 6* 4 8 9 6 1 6 9
5 1 0  W lA  9 * 1 .* 7
7 8 0 9 * ( I |  0 .0 0 0 1
m t m > i s i  o . o o o i
P404>Q < 0 .0 7
50 *  * 1 0  
2 9 1  01 
o f  M in
M N o r
03*0>
MOOC
q u a n t iL C 8 i o c r - * i











6  941 
* 2 1 9 7 6 9
2  0 1 1 2 2 2 * 7 7 7 9 9 0 0 0 1 1 * 9 7 7 7 6
0  3 * * 9 9 9 4 6 6 7 7  7 7 8 4 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 1  M i l  1 2 1 1 3 3 * * * 9 9 6 7 7  
MULTIPLY S 1 W .U A 7  * 9  1 0 * * » 0 J
12729












6 9 2 9
6 9 6 9
71* 6
29 9 3 6
32 1 2 9
RETURN ON ASSE r s  
U N IV A R IA IE  S 7 A M S 7 I C S  
V IA *  « 0  
REGULATED SAMPLE
Q U A N 1 I L C S { 0 r r s i | )
MEAN
s i o  O tV
s k e w n e s s
u s s
c v
I r  n r  a n «o
SUN RANK
NUM - a  o  
DlNUITMAL
79
6 . 6 9 1 2 9  
I . f» 109*1 0.0t*?9I? 
1 A M .93  
> 5 . 1 0 1 6  
5 6 . 4 * 7 *  I960
79
0 . 0 6 4 M J  
S U M  L I A /
8 6  *
6 6  16  7 
8 *  2 6  
0 ?  >l>
8(3 76 
76 *
7 6  0«i 
7*  0 2 7 2 1 6  
72 6 7 3 7 8  
70  2
6 6  2 6 9 1 5 6 9  
6 6  0 0 1 * 6 / 9 2 * /  61* 0278915 
4 2  2 6 / 1 5 6  
6 0  1 1 / 9 0 2 )
5 4  / 7 1 5 5  
5 6  2 5 1  
5 *  0 / 1  
5 2  2j 
5 0  6 *4 6
* 6
'I*
s u m  w c ? s
SUM
VARIANCE 
M ill I O S I S
r s s
S IO  M r ATI f*06>iii 
p r o n > i s i
P ft00> O
7 9
5 2 4 . 7 7  
1 . 0 2 2  
0 . 2 1 1 6 9 2  
7 9 .7 1 6 1  
O . 1 1 3 7 *  
0.0001 
0.0001
> 0 .  15
i n n f  m ax  
7 5 1  Q1 
5 0 *  MtO 
2 5 1  Q1 
OX HIM
HANCf
q ) - Q i
M o o r
6 . 8 *  
7 . 38  
6 . 6 1  
6 . 0 /
* . 9 1
1 .3 1
5 . 6 7




















8 . 8 *  
8 . 6 J  
6 . 2 *  
5 .  *  7 
5 . 0 6  
3 . 9 )
t o w r s f  
3 . 9 3  
* .  19 
* . 9 6  
5 . 0 6  
5 . 2 2
n  t o n  r s  r 
8 . 5 6  
6 .A J  
8.66 
4 . 6 7  
6 . 4 *
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Appendix B 
LIST OF BANKS IN SAMPLE
FIRST NB IN TUSCUMBIA AL 1976
UNIVERSITY NB OF FT COLLINS CO 1974 
LAKEWOODCO NATIONAL BANK CO 1974
FIRST NAT BK OF FRANKFORD DE 1973 
FLORIDA NB AT GAINESVILLE FL 1976 
FLAGSHIP BK OF MELBOURNE NA FL 1974 
BARNETT BANK OF OCALA NA FL 1975
FLGSHP 1ST NB OF VOLUSIA CTY FL 1973 
HALIFAX NATIONAL BANK FL 1974
GULF COAST NATIONAL BAK FL 1973
INDUSTRIAL NATIONAL BANK FL 1973
NATIONAL BANK OF GEORGIA GA 1976
FIRST NB OF NEWTON CTY GA 1974
FIRST NAT BK OF PAULDING CTY GA 1973 
FARMERS NB OF MONTICELLO GA 1974
FIRST NAT BANK OF VALDOSTA GA 1975 
FIRST NB OF PRAIRIE CITY IA 1974
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK OF ID ID 1976 
NATIONAL BANK OF ALEDO IL 1975
EXCHANGE NAT BK OF CHICAGO IL 1973 
NORTH SHORE NB OF CHICAGO IL 1973
STEEL CITY NB OF CHICAGO IL 1975
FIRST NB OF GENEVA I.L 1976
FIRST NB OF LAKE BLUFF IL 1973
FIRST NB OF METAMORA IL 1975
NAT BK OF MONTICELLO IL 1976
FIRST NAT BK OF RAYMOND IL 1975
ROODHOUSE NATIONAL BANK IL 1975
FIRST NB OF CLOVERDALE IN 1973
FIRST NAT BANK OF GOODLAND KS 1976
FIRST NAT BANK OF ONAGA KS 1974
FIRST NAT BANK OF WAVERLY KS 1973
FIRST NAT BK IN ARCADIA LA 1976
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK LA 1974
FIRST NB IN ST MARY PARISH LA 1976
FIRST NB OF BLOOMING PRAIRIE MN 1973
FIRST PLYMOUTH NAT BANK MN 1973
FIRST NAT BK OF CLAYTON MO 1973
FIRST NB OF WEST PLAINS MO 1974
FIRST NAT BANK OF PICAYUNE MS 1976
PEOPLES BK OF MISSISSIPPI NA MS 1973 
NATIONAL BANK OF HARVEY ND 1973
SANTA CLARITA NAT BANK 
W NB OF COLORADO SPRINGS 




NORTHWESTERN NB OF NORFOLK 
FIRST NAT BANK OF WALTHILL 
URBAN NATIONAL BANK 
UNTD JERSEY BK/MIDSTATE NA 
SANTA FE NATIONAL BANK 
FIRST NAT BK OF EAST ISLIP 
NATIONAL BANK OF MONTPELIER 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
YUKON NATIONAL BANK 
BLUE BALL NATIONAL BANK 
FIRST NAT BANK OF MAPLETON 
PEN ARGYL NATIONAL BANK 
FIRST NB OF SLIPPERY ROCK 
FIRST NAT BANK OF STRASBURG 
FIRST NAT BK OF GIBSON CTY 
FIRST NB OF RHEA COUNTY 
FIRST NAT BANK OF BELLVILLE 
BOWIE NATIONAL BANK 
CITIZENS NAT BK OF DALLAS 
HAMILTON NATIONAL BANK 
FIRST NAT BK OF HUNTSVILLE 
FIRST NAT BANK OF LEVELLAND 
FIRST NAT BANK OF MC GREGOR 
FIRST NAT BANK OF PLANO 
MOUNTAIN NB OF CLIFTON FORGE VA 
RICHLANDS NATIONAL BANK 
FIRST NAT BK OF TROUTVILLE 
RANDOLPH NATIONAL BANK 
UNIVERSITY NATIONAL BANK 
CTZ NB OF BERKELEY SPGS 
FIRST NAT BK OF WETUMPKA 
FIRST NAT BANK OF DAILY CITY CA 
PIKES PEAK NATIONAL BANK 
ROCK FORD NATIONAL BANK 
FARMERS NAT BANK OF AULT 
COLONIAL NATIONAL BANK 
CENTRAL NAT BANK OF MIAMI 
BARNETT BANK OF ST. PETERBRG FL 
BARNETT BANK OF CLEARWATER 
FIRST NB OF PUNTA GORDA 
ATLANTIC FNB OF DAYTONA BCH 
FIRST NB OF VOLUSIA CITY 
CITY NB OF HALLENDALE 
EAST FIRST NAT BANK 
FIRST NB OF COLUMBUS 
FIRST NAT BNK OF ALMA 
FIRST NB OF LOUISVILLE 
FIRST NB OF HOUSTON CITY 
CITIZENS NB OF QUITMAN 
FIRST NB OF WOODBINE 
FARMERS NAT BANK OF BUHL 





















































COMMERCIAL NB OF PEORIA 
O'HARE INTERNATIONAL BANK 
UNION NAT BANK OF. CHICAGO 
FIRST NAT BANK OF DOLTON 
LEMONT NATIONAL BANK 
TAZEWELL COUNTY NAT BANK 
FIRST NB OF STEELEVILLE 
FIRST NAT BANK OF GALENA 
FIRST NAT BANK OF BARRY 
FIRST NAT BANK OF MONTICELLO 
CENTRAL NB OF JUNCTION CITY 
FIRST NAT BANK OF NATOMA 
DOWNS NATIONAL BANK 
FIRST NB IN MANSFIELD 
LAFOURCHE NB OF THIBODAUX 
FIRST NB OF COVINGTON 
FIRST NB IN WINNEBAGO 
OAKLEY NB OF BUFFALO 
AMERICAN NB OF ST. JOSEPH 
FIRST NB OF CAPE GIRARDEAU 
FIRST AMERICAN NB OF IUKA 
FIRST CITIZENS NAT BANK 
SECURITY NAT BANK OF EDGELY 
FIRST NB & TR OF BEATRICE 
FIRST BANK OF JOHNSON 
WOODRIDGE NAT BANK 
UNION CENTER NAT BANK 
FIRST NB OF FARMINGTON 
FIRST NB OF LONG ISLAND 
MERCHANTS NB OF HILLSBORO 
CITY NAT BANK OF SAYRE 
STATE NB OF HEAVNER 
CITIZENS NB OF EDMOND 
DENVER NATIONAL BANK 
CITIZENS NB OF ASHLAND 
FIRST NAT BANK OF BATH 
HARTLEY NB OF BEDFORD 
NAZARETH NB & TR CO 
FIRST NB OF FRANKLIN CITY 
ONIEDA BANK AND TRUST 
FIRST NAT BANK OF QUITMAN 
FIRST NAT BANK IN LULING 
1ST CITY NB OF ARLINGTON 
CITIZENS NB AT BROWNWOOD 
FIRST NB IN MOUNT PLEASANT 
GRAHAM NATIONAL BANK 
KATY NATIONAL BANK 
COMMOMWEALTH NB OF DALLAS 
GATEWAY NB OF FORT WORTH 
BATH CITY NB OF HOT SPRINGS 
FIRST NAT BANK OF LURAY 






















































FACTRY PT NB OF MANCHESTER VT 1974 
FIRST NB OF PORT WASHINGTON WI 1974 
FIRST NB OF KEYSTONE WV 1974
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